Capitulum 14 Chapter 14 Whether sensible objects are infinitely divisible Obiciet autem aliquis, si omne corpus in infinita dividitur, et passiones ergo sensibiles, puta color et sapor et odor et sonus et gravedo et frigiditas et calidum et leve et durum et molle. But someone will raise an objection: if every body is infinitely divisible, are sensible affections also? For instance, color and flavor and odor and sound, and heaviness and coldness, and hot and light, and hard and soft. Aut impossibile: activum enim est unumquodque ipsorum sensus (in eo enim quod possunt movere illum dicuntur omnia), quare necessarium sensum in infinita dividi, et omnem magnitudinem esse sensibilem. Impossibile enim album quidem videre, non quantum autem. But this is impossible. For each of these is something that activates a sense power. For all are named from the fact that they are able to move a sense power. Necessarily, then, sense is infinitely divisible, and every magnitude is sensible. For it is impossible to see something that is white but not a quantity. Si enim non sic, utique continget esse aliquod corpus nullum habens colorem neque gravedinem nec aliam talem passionem, quare nec omnino sensibile: haec enim sensibilia sunt. Sensibile igitur erit compositum nec ex sensibilibus. Sed necesse: non enim ex mathematicis. For if this is not so, then there can be a body that has no color, or heaviness, or other such affection, and so is not sensible at all: for these are the sensible objects. Therefore, there will be something sensible composed of what is not sensible. But it necessarily is, for it is not composed of mathematical objects. Amplius cui adiudicabimus haec aut cognoscemus, nisi intellectui? Sed non intelligibilia: nec enim intelligit intellectus quae exterius nisi cum sensu. Moreover, what will we assign them to other than intellect, or how will we know them? But they are not intelligible, for intellect does not understand what is outside except with sensation. Sed si haec habent sic, videtur testificari illis qui indivisibiles faciunt magnitudines: sic quidem utique solvetur sermo. Sed hoc impossibile: dictum est enim prius in sermonibus qui sunt de motu. But if this is so, it seems to support those who make indivisible magnitudes: thus the discussion is resolved. But this is impossible, as was said before in the discussions of motion. De solutione autem eorum simul manifestum erit et quare terminate species coloris et saporis et sonorum et aliorum sensibilium. Quorum quidem enim sunt ultima, necesse terminata esse quae intus: contraria autem ultima, omne autem sensibile habet contrarietatem, velud in colore album et nigrum, in sapore dulce et amarum; et in aliis itaque omnibus sunt ultima quae contraria. With the resolution of this, it will at the same time also be made clear why the species of color and flavor and sounds and other sensible objects are limited. For what is inside the extremes is necessarily determinate, and extremes are contraries. But every kind of sensible object has contrariety, for instance, black and white in color, sweet and bitter in flavor. And so in all the others there are extremes that are contraries. Continuum quidem igitur ad infinita dividitur inequalia, ad equalia vero finita; quod autem non secundum se continuum, in species finitas. A continuum, then, is divisible into an infinite number of unequal parts, but into a finite number of equal ones. And what is not of itself continuous is divisible into finite species. Quoniam ergo passiones quidem ut species dicendum, existunt autem in continuitate et in hiis, sumendum quia quod potencia et quod actu aliud. Et propter hoc decimum millesimum milii latet visum, quamvis visus superveniat. Et qui in dyesi sonus latet, quamvis continuus existens auditur omnis cantus; distantia vero inter existentis ad ultima latet. Similiter autem et in aliis sensibilibus parva omnino: potentia namque visibilia ipsa, actu autem non, quando non separaverit; et enim inest potentia quae pedalis bipedi, actu itaque divisa. We must speak of the affections as “species,” although they exist in a continuity and in these parts. Therefore, we must take it that what is in potentiality and what is in actuality are different. For this reason a tenth of a thousandth of a grain of millet escapes the notice of sight, although sight goes over it. And the sound in a diesis escapes notice, although all of the singing, which is continuous, is heard. The distance between the extremes escapes notice. It is similar with the extremely small in other sensible objects. They themselves are visible in potentiality, but not in actuality when they are not separated. Thus a one-foot length exists in potentiality in something two feet long, and exists in actuality when it is divided off. Separatae autem tantae superabundantiae rationabiliter quidem utique et resolvuntur in continentia, velud minimus sapor mari infusus. But it is reasonable that separated parts of such extremely small size are dissolved into the surroundings, like a tiny amount of flavor poured into the sea. Quin immo quoniam neque sensus superabundantia secundum ipsam sensibilis nec separata. Potentia enim inest in certiori superabundantia, nec tantum sensibile separatum erit actu sentiri. Sed tamen erit sensibile: potentia enim est iam, et actu erit adveniens. Quod quidem igitur quaedam magnitudines et passiones latent, et propter quam causam, et quomodo sensibilia et quomodo non, dictum est. But there is no extremity of the sense power to correspond to that of the sensible object itself, even if it is separated. The extreme smallness is in potentiality to a surer sense power. And a separated sensible object of such a size will not be sensed in actuality. Still, it will be a sensible object, for there is already the power, and it will be in actuality when a sense power comes to it. Thus it has been said that some magnitudes and affections escape notice; and for what cause; and the way in which they are sensible objects, and the way in which they are not. Cum autem itaque inexistentia sic quanta quaedam sint ut actu sensibilia sint, et non solum quod in toto sed et seorsum, finita necesse esse secundum aliquem numerum, et colores et sapores et sonos. But since there are quantities existing within so as to be sensible in actuality, and not only as in the whole, but also separately, they—colors and flavors and sounds—are necessarily finite according to some number. Obiciet autem aliquis etc. Postquam Philosophus determinavit de organis sensuum et de sensibilibus, hic determinat quasdam quaestiones circa sensum et sensibilia. But someone will raise an objection (445b3). After the Philosopher has determined about sense-organs and sensible objects, here he determines some questions about the sense power and sensible objects. Et primo movet quamdam quaestionem circa ipsa sensibilia; First he raises a question about sensible objects themselves. secundo movet aliam circa immutationem sensus a sensibili, ibi: obiiciet autem utique aliquis etc.; Second he raises another about alteration of the sense power by a sensible object, where he says but someone will raise an objection (ch. 15, 446a20). tertio movet tertiam circa ipsum sensum, <ibi>: est autem quaedam obiectio etc. Third he raises a third about the sense power itself, where he says but there is also another such objection (ch. 16, 447a12). Circa primum tria facit: On the first point he does three things. primo movet quaestionem; First he raises the question. secundo inducit rationes ad quaestionem, ibi: aut impossibile etc.; Second he introduces arguments about it, where he says but this is impossible (445b6). tertio solvit, ibi: de solutione autem eorum etc. Third he solves it, where he says with the resolution of this (445b20). Dicit ergo primo quod omne corpus in infinita dividitur (hoc enim est de ratione continui, ut patet in libro Physicorum); qualitates autem sensibiles quae passiones dicuntur, ut dicitur in Praedicamentis, sunt in corpore aliquo sicut in subiecto; est ergo quaestio quam quis obiicere potest utrum etiam ipsae qualitates sensibiles, sicut color et sapor et alia huiusmodi, in infinitum dividantur. Accordingly he first says that every body is infinitely divisible: for this is of the nature of a continuum, as is clear in the book the Physics. But sensible qualities—which are called affections, as is said in the Categories—are in a body as in their subject. Therefore there is a question someone can raise in objection: whether sensible qualities themselves, such as color and flavor and so on, are infinitely divisible also. Deinde cum dicit: aut impossibile etc., obiicit ad quaestionem motam. Then, when he says but this is impossible (445b6), he raises objections concerning the question posed. Et primo ad ostendendum quod qualitates sensibiles non dividuntur in infinitum; First he raises objections to show that sensible qualities are not infinitely divisible. secundo ad oppositum, ibi: si enim non sic etc.; Second he raises objections on the other side, where he says for if this is not so (445b11). tertio excludit quamdam falsam solutionem, ibi: sed si haec habent sic etc. Third he eliminates a false solution, where he says but if this is so (445b17). Dicit ergo primo quod impossibile videtur qualitates sensibiles dividi in infinitum, quia unaquaeque praedictarum sensibilium qualitatum est nata agere in sensum (in hoc enim propria ratio uniuscuiusque eorum consistit quod moveat sensum, sicut ad rationem coloris pertinet quod possit movere visum), si ergo praedictae qualitates in infinitum dividuntur, consequens erit quod sensus, id est ipsum sentire, in infinitum dividatur; sed moveri dividitur in infinitum secundum divisionem magnitudinis, secundum quam aliquid movetur; et ita sequeretur quod, sicut id quod movetur pertransit quamlibet magnitudinem, ita sentiens sentiret omnem magnitudinem quantumcumque parvam, et sic omnis magnitudo esset sensibilis. Accordingly he first says that it seems impossible for sensible qualities to be divided infinitely, because each of the above-mentioned sensible qualities naturally acts on a sense power. For the proper nature of each of them consists in this: it is able to move a sense power; for example, it belongs to the nature of color to be able to move the sense of sight. If, then, the above-mentioned qualities are infinitely divisible, the consequence will be that sense—that is, the act of sensing itself—is infinitely divisible. Now an instance of being moved is infinitely divisible according to division of the magnitude through which a thing is moved; and so it would follow that, as something moved goes through every part of the magnitude, so one who senses would sense any magnitude, however small, and so every magnitude would be sensible. Subdit autem rationem quare non concludit etiam puncta esse sensibilia, quia impossibile est videre album quod non sit quantum; et eadem ratio est de sensibilibus aliis (huius autem ratio est quia sensus est virtus in magnitudine, cum sit actus organi corporei, et ideo non potest pati nisi ab habente magnitudinem, activum enim debet esse proportionatum passivo). But he adds a reason why he does not conclude that even points are perceptible to sense: because it is impossible to see something white that is not a quantity; and the argument is the same with respect to other sensible objects. The reason for this is that a sense power is a power in a magnitude, since it is the actuality of a bodily organ, and so it can be affected only by what has magnitude: for what is active must be proportioned to what is passive. Relinquit autem pro inconvenienti omnem magnitudinem esse sensibilem (quod quomodo sit intelligendum, infra patebit). There remains the problem that every magnitude is perceptible; how this is to be understood will be made clear below (ch. 18, 449a20–31). Unde concludi potest quod qualitates sensibiles non dividuntur in infinitum. Hence it can be concluded that sensible qualities are not infinitely divisible. Deinde cum dicit: si enim non sic etc., obiicit ad oppositum duabus rationibus. Then, when he says for if this is not so (445b11), he raises objections on the opposite side with two arguments. Quarum prima talis est. Si qualitates sensibiles non dividantur, contingit esse aliquod corpus minimum transcendens divisionem sensibilium qualitatum nullam habens sensibilem qualitatem, id est neque colorem neque gravitatem nec aliquod aliud huiusmodi, et ita huiusmodi corpus non erit sensibile, quia solae praedictae qualitates sunt sensibiles. Cum igitur huiusmodi parva corpora sunt partes totius corporis quod est sensibile, sequitur quod corpus sensibile sit compositum non ex sensibilibus. Sed necesse est sensibile corpus ex sensibilibus componi, non enim potest dici quod corpus sensibile componatur ex mathematicis corporibus, in quibus consideratur quantitas sine qualitatibus sensibilibus. Relinquitur ergo quod oportet qualitates sensibiles in infinitum dividi. The first is this. If sensible qualities are not infinitely divisible, then there can be a minimal body that transcends division of sensible qualities and has no sensible quality, i.e. neither color nor heaviness nor any other such quality. And so such a body will not be sensible, because only the qualities mentioned are sensible objects. Therefore, since these tiny bodies are parts of a whole body that is sensible, it will follow that a sensible body is composed of what is not sensible. But a sensible body is necessarily composed of what is sensible, for it cannot be said that a sensible body is composed of mathematical bodies, in which quantity is considered without sensible qualities. Therefore it remains that sensible qualities must be infinitely divisible. Secundam rationem ponit ibi: amplius cui adiudicabimus etc. Et procedit ratio sua ex hoc quod anima nata est cognoscere omnia vel secundum sensum vel secundum intellectum, ut habitum est in III De anima. He presents the second argument where he says moreover, what will we assign them to (445b15). His argument proceeds from the point that the soul by nature knows all things, whether by sense or intellect, as was established in On the Soul 3. Si ergo praedicta minima corpora quae transcendunt divisionem qualitatum sensibilium non fuerint sensibilia, utpote sensibilibus qualitatibus carentia, non possunt adiudicari nisi intellectui ut cognoscantur per ipsum. Sed non potest dici quod sunt intelligibilia: nihil enim eorum quae sunt extra animam intellectus intelligit nisi cum sensu eorum, id est simul ea sentiendo. Si ergo huiusmodi minima corpora non sentiuntur, intelligi non poterunt. Accordingly, if the above-mentioned minimal bodies that transcend division of sensible qualities are not sensible because they lack sensible qualities, they can be assigned only to intellect as the power that knows them. But it cannot be said that they are intelligible: for intellect understands none of the things outside the soul except with sensation of them—that is, by simultaneously sensing them. If, therefore, these minimal bodies are not sensed, they will not be able to be understood. Dicit autem hoc ad excludendum opinionem Platonis, qui posuit formas intellectas esse extra animam; secundum Aristotelem autem res intellectae sunt ipsae naturae rerum quae sunt in singularibus, quae quidem secundum quod in singularibus sunt cadunt sub apprehensione sensus, intellectus autem apprehendit huiusmodi naturas absolute et attribuit eis quasdam intentiones intelligibiles, scilicet esse genus vel speciem; quae quidem intentiones sunt solum in intellectu, non autem exterius, unde solus intellectus eas cognoscit. He says this to eliminate an opinion of Plato, who held that the forms understood exist outside the soul. But according to Aristotle the things understood are the very natures of things in singulars, which, inasmuch as they are in singulars, fall under the apprehension of the sense power. But the intellect apprehends these natures in an absolute way and assigns to them certain intelligible intentions, namely that of being a genus or species. These intentions exist only in the intellect, not outside it: hence only the intellect knows them. Deinde cum dicit: sed si haec habent etc., excludit falsam responsionem. Posset enim aliquis dicere quod, ex quo posita divisione magnitudinis in infinitum sequitur inconveniens, quicquid dicatur de sensibilibus qualitatibus sive quod dividantur in infinitum sive quod non, videtur hoc attestari opinioni illorum qui ponunt aliquas magnitudines indivisibiles: per hunc enim modum praedicta dubitatio solvetur, si enim corpus non est divisibile in infinitum, non sequetur aliqua corpora esse insensibilia, si in infinitum non dividetur qualitas sensibilis. Sed hoc est impossibile, scilicet aliquas magnitudines esse indivisibiles, ut patet per ea quae dicta sunt in sermonibus de motu, id est in VI Physicorum. Then, when he says but if this is so (445b17), he eliminates a false response. One might argue as follows. A problem follows from positing the infinite divisibility of magnitude, whatever may be said about sensible qualities, whether that they are infinitely divisible or not. This, then, seems to support the opinion of those who posit indivisible magnitudes, because the difficulty is solved in this way: for if a body is not infinitely divisible, then, since sensible quality is not infinitely divisible, it will not follow that there are bodies that cannot be sensed. But this opinion that some magnitudes are indivisible is impossible, as is evident from what was said in the discussions of motion, that is, in Physics 6.