Capitulum 15 Chapter 15 Whether there is a midpoint between the sensible object and the sense Obiciet autem utique aliquis igitur: perveniunt aut sensibilia vel motus qui a sensibilibus, qualitercunque fiat sensus, cum operentur, in medium primo? Quemadmodum odor videtur facere et sonus: propius enim prius sentit aliquis odorem, et sonus posterius ictu venit. Ergone ita et visibile et lumen? But someone will raise an objection: do either the sensible objects or the movements caused by the sensible objects—however sensation occurs—first reach a midpoint when they act? Odor and sound seem to do this: for one who is closer senses odor earlier, and sound arrives after the striking. Is it the same, then, in the case of a visible object and light? Quemadmodum et Empedocles dicit attingere prius quod a sole lumen ad medium prius quam ad visum aut ad terram. Empedocles says that light from the sun in this way arrives at a midpoint before arriving at the sense of sight or the earth. Putabitur autem utique hoc rationabiliter accidere: motum enim movetur ab aliquo in aliquid, quare necesse est quoddam tempus esse in quo movetur ab altero in alterum; tempus autem omne divisibile, quare erat quando non videbatur, sed adhuc ferebatur radius in medio. It might be thought reasonable that this is what happens. For what is moved is moved from something to something, and so there is necessarily a time in which it is moved from one to the other. But every length of time is divisible. Thus there was a time when the ray was not seen, but was still being brought in the midpoint. Et si omne simul audit et audivit, et omnino sentit et sensit, et non est generatio eorum, sed sunt absque fieri, tamen nihil minus, quemadmodum sonus iam facto ictu nondum apud auditum. Manifestat autem hoc et litterarum transfiguratio, quemadmodum facta latione in medio: non enim dictum videntur audivisse, quia transfiguratur aer delatus. Ergo sic et color et lumen: non enim in eo quod quomodocunque habet, hoc videt, hoc vero videtur, quemadmodum equalia sunt; nullum enim oportet alicubi utrumque esse; equalibus enim factis non differt vel prope vel longe ad invicem esse. Everything simultaneously hears and has heard, and in general senses and has sensed. There is no generation of sensations; they have no coming into being. Nevertheless sound is not already at the sense of hearing when the blow is struck. The reconfiguration of letters when they are carried through a midpoint makes this clear: people apparently have not heard what was said, because the air carried is reconfigured in being carried. It is thus in the case of color and light: for it is not the case that this sees and that is seen if they are related in just any way. This is how it is with things that are equal: neither has to be in a particular place, since when things are made equal, it makes no difference if they are either near to or far from one another. Vel circa sonum quidem et odorem hoc accidere rationabile. Quemadmodum enim aer et aqua continua quidem aliter, partibiles autem amborum motus. Propter quod et est quidem ut idem audiat primus et extremus et odoret, est autem quomodo non. Videtur autem quibusdam esse obiectio et de hiis; impossibile enim dicunt quidam alium per aliud idem audire et videre et odorare: non enim possibile esse multos et seorsum existentes audire et odorare, intercipiens enim ipsum ipsius esse. Vel movens primum, puta coctonum vel thus vel ignem eundem et unum numero sentiunt omnes; id autem quod iam proprium alterum numero, specie autem idem, quare simul multi vident et odorant et audiunt. On the other hand, it is reasonable for this to happen in the case of sound and odor. For air and water are indeed in a way continua, but the movements of both are divisible. For this reason too, it is the same thing that the first person and the last person hears and smells, but in a way it is not. But there seems to some to be an objection also about this. For some say that it is impossible for each person, by means of what is different, to hear and see and smell the same thing. For it is not possible for many who stand apart from one another to hear and smell the same thing, that is, for it to be cut off from itself. On the other hand, all sense the original mover—for example the quince, or incense, or fire—which is numerically one and the same. What is individual is numerically different, but specifically the same. Therefore many simultaneously see and smell and hear. Sunt autem neque corpora haec, sed passio et motus quidam (non enim utique hoc accideret), neque sine corpore. But these things are not bodies, but an affection and a movement. For otherwise this would not happen. Nor are they independent of body. De lumine autem alia ratio est: per unum enim esse aliquid lumen est, sed non motus aliquid. But the account of light is different, for there is light through some one single being, but there is not a movement. Omnino autem nec similiter in alteratione se habet et latione; lationes namque rationabiliter in medio prius attingunt (videtur autem sonus esse lati cuiusdam motus), quaecunque vero alterantur, non adhuc similiter. In general, alteration and transfer are not alike. For it is reasonable that transfers should first reach a midpoint; and sound seems to be a movement of transfer. But what is altered is not like this. Contingit enim simul totum alterari, et non dimidium prius, velud aquam simul omnem coagulari. For it can happen that a whole is altered all at once, not half of it first, for example when a whole body of water is solidified all at once. At tamen si fuerit multum quod calefit aut coagulatur, habitum ab habito patitur, primum autem ab ipso faciente transmutari necesse et simul alterari et subito. Esset autem utique et gustare quemadmodum odor, si in humido essemus et remotius ante tangere ipsum sentiremus. Nevertheless, if what is heated or solidified is large, what is contiguous is affected by the contiguous. But the first is necessarily altered, all at once and instantaneously, by the very thing that is acting. And tasting would be like odor if we existed in moisture, and sensed it from a distance before touching it. Rationabiliter autem quorum est intermedium sensitivi, non simul omne patitur, nisi in lumine propter predicta, propter hoc autem et de videre: lumen enim facit videre. But it is reasonable, where the sensitive part has a midpoint, that not all of it be affected all at once, except in the case of light, because of what was said above, and, for the same reason, in the case of seeing: for light causes seeing. Obiciet autem utique aliquis etc. Postquam Philosophus prosecutus est quaestionem primam pertinentem ad ipsa sensibilia, hic accedit ad quaestionem secundam, quae pertinet ad immutationem sensus a sensibilibus. Et circa hoc tria facit: But someone will raise an objection (446a20). After the Philosopher has followed up the first question, which concerns sensible things themselves, here he proceeds to the second question, which concerns the alteration of the sense power by sensible objects. On this point he does three things. primo movet quaestionem; First he raises the question. secundo argumentatur ad ipsam, ibi: quemadmodum et Empedocles dicit etc.; Second he argues it, where he says Empedocles says (446a26). tertio solvit, ibi: vel circa sonum etc. Third he solves it, where he says on the other hand (446b13). Circa primum considerandum est quod, sicut supra habitum est, quidam posuerunt sensum immutari a sensibilibus per modum cuiusdam defluxus, ita quod ipsa sensibilia, id est defluentia ab eis, perveniunt usque ad sensum; ipse vero posuit quod sensibilia per modum cuiusdam alterationis immutant medium, ita quod huiusmodi permutationes perveniunt usque ad sensum. On the first point it must be considered that, as was established above, some held that a sense power is changed by sensible things by way of an emanation, so that it is the sensible things themselves—that is, the emanations from them—that reach the sense power. But Aristotle himself held that the sensible things change the midpoint by way of a certain alteration, so that it is the changes of this kind that reach the sense power. Est ergo quaestio num, qualitercumque fiat sensus, utrum vel ipsa sensibilia, secundum aliorum opinionem, vel immutationes quae sunt a sensibilibus, secundum suam opinionem, primo perveniant ad medium quam ad sensum? Et hoc non habet dubitationem in auditu et odoratu: manifestum est enim quod aliquis de propinquo prius sentit odorem, et similiter sonus posterius pervenit ad auditum quam fiat ictus percussionis quae causat sonum, sicut manifeste potest percipere qui percussionem inspicit ex longinquo. Manifestum est autem quod in gustu et tactu haec quaestio locum non habet, quia non sentiunt per medium extrinsecum. Unde dubitatio videtur esse de solo visu, utrum scilicet visibile et lumen quod facit videre prius perveniat ad medium quam ad sensum, vel ad quemcumque terminum. Therefore there is a question, however sensation occurs: whether the sensible objects themselves—according to the opinion of others—or alterations caused by the sensible objects—according to Aristotle’s own opinion—first reach a midpoint before reaching the sense power. There is no difficulty about this in the case of hearing and smell, for it is clear that one senses odor earlier from nearby, and similarly that sound reaches hearing after the striking of the blow that causes sound occurs, as one who sees the blow from a distance can clearly perceive. And it is clear that this question has no place in the case of taste and touch, because they do not perceive through an external medium. Hence the difficulty seems to be about sight alone, that is, whether a visible object and the light that causes seeing first reach a midpoint before reaching the sense power or any terminus. Deinde cum dicit: quemadmodum et Empedocles etc., obiicit ad quaestionem motam. Then, when he says Empedocles says (446a26), he raises an objection concerning the question asked. Et primo argumentatur ad partem falsam quaestionis; First he argues on the false side of the question. secundo excludit quamdam falsam solutionem, ibi: et si omne simul etc. Second he eliminates a false solution where he says everything simultaneously hears (446b2). Argumentatur autem ad quaestionem primo per auctoritatem Empedoclis, qui dixit quod lumen a sole progrediens primo pervenit ad medium quam ad visum qui videt lumen, vel ad terram quae videtur per lumen et ultra quam radius solis non procedit. He argues in response to the question first by the authority of Empedocles, who said that light proceeding from the sun first reaches a midpoint before reaching the sense of sight that sees the light, or the earth that is seen by means of the light, and beyond which the sun’s ray does not proceed. Et hanc quidem quaestionem tetigit in II De anima, sed improbavit eam per hoc quod in tam magno spatio sicut est ab oriente usque ad nos, latere nos temporis successionem impossibile est. He touched on this question in On the Soul 2, but disproved the opinion as follows: in such a great distance as there is from the rising sun to ourselves, it is impossible for a temporal succession to escape our notice. Secundo ibi: putabitur autem etc., argumentatur ad idem per rationem. Et dicit quod hoc videtur rationabiliter accidere, scilicet quod visibile vel lumen primo perveniat ad medium quam ad visum: videtur enim esse quidam motus ipsius visibilis vel luminis pervenientis ad visum; omne autem quod movetur, movetur ab aliquo in aliquid, ita scilicet quod prius sit in termino a quo movetur et posterius in termino ad quem movetur (alioquin, si simul esset in utroque termino, non moveretur de uno in aliud); prius autem et posterius in motu numeratur tempore, ergo necesse est esse aliquod tempus in quo visibile vel lumen movetur a corpore visibili vel illuminante usque ad visum; omne autem tempus est divisibile, ut probatum est in VI Physicorum; si ergo accipiamus medium illius temporis, adhuc radius luminis vel ipsum visibile nondum pervenit ad visum, sed adhuc movebatur per medium (quia oportet dividi magnitudinem per quam aliquid movetur secundum divisionem temporis, ut probatum est in VI Physicorum). Second, where he says it might be thought reasonable (446a28), he argues the same point by reason. He says that it seems reasonable for this to happen—that is, for the visible object or light to first reach a midpoint before reaching the sense of sight. For there seems to be some movement of the visible object itself, or of the light, in coming to the sense of sight. But everything that is moved is moved from something to something, in such a way that before, it is at the terminus from which it is moved, and after, it is at the terminus to which it is moved: otherwise, if it were simultaneously at both termini, it would not be moved from one to the other. But before and after in movement are counted by time. Therefore there is necessarily some time in which the visible object, or the light, is moved from the visible or illuminating body to the sense of sight. But every length of time is divisible, as was proved in Physics 6. Therefore if we take the midpoint of the time in question, at that point the ray of light, or the visible object itself, has not yet reached the sense of sight, but is still being moved through the midpoint, because the magnitude through which something is moved must be divided according to division of time, as was proved in Physics 6. Deinde cum dicit: et si omne simul etc., excludit quamdam insufficientem responsionem. Then, when he says everything simultaneously hears (446b2), he eliminates an inadequate response. Posset enim aliquis putare quod sensibilia non prius perveniant ad medium quam ad sensum, quia sensus simul percipit sensibile absque successione, ita quod in auditione non prius est audire quam auditum esse, sicut in successivis prius est moveri quam motum esse, sed simul dum aliquis audit, iam audivit, quia in instanti perficitur tota auditio, et universaliter hoc est verum in omni sensu, quod simul scilicet aliquid sentit et sensit, et hoc ideo quia non est generatio eorum, sed sunt absque fieri. Someone could think that sensible objects do not first reach a midpoint before reaching the sense power because sense perceives a sensible object all at once, without successiveness. Thus, in hearing, hearing does not come before having been heard in the way that, in what is successive, being moved does come before having been moved: rather, when someone is hearing, he simultaneously already has heard, because the whole act of hearing is completed in an instant. And this is universally true of every sense, that is, that it simultaneously senses and has sensed something. This is so because there is no generation of sensations; they have no coming into being. Illorum enim dicitur esse generatio ad quorum esse pervenitur per aliquem motum successivum, sive illius successivi motus sit ipsa eorum forma terminus (sicut si album dicatur generari quia per successivam alterationem pervenitur ad albedinem), sive dispositio ad formam ipsorum sit motus successivi terminus (sicut ignis et aqua dicuntur generari quia dispositiones ad formam ipsorum, quae sunt qualitates elementares, per alterationem successivam acquiruntur); illa vero incipiunt esse absque hoc quod generentur vel fiant quae nec secundum se nec secundum aliquas dispositiones praecedentes in ipsis per motum successivum causantur (sicut dextrum causatur in aliquo nullo successivo praeexistente in ipso, sed quodam alio facto sibi sinistro; similiter et aer incipit illuminari nullo motu praeexistente in ipso, sed ad praesentiam corporis illuminantis). Et similiter sensus incipit sentire nullo motu in ipso praeexistente, sed ad debitam oppositionem sensibilis. We say that there is a “generation” of things that have a being (esse) which is reached by a successive or gradual movement: whether the terminus of the successive movement is the very form of the things, as when a white thing is said to be generated because a thing reaches whiteness through successive alteration; or whether the terminus of the successive movement is a disposition to their form, as fire and water are said to be generated because dispositions to their forms—that is, elemental qualities—are acquired through successive alteration. But those things begin to be without being generated or coming into being that are not—either of themselves or with respect to any preceding dispositions in them—caused through successive movement. For example, “to the right” is caused in a thing not by any successive movement pre-existing in it, but by something else having been made “to the left” of it. Likewise, air begins to be illuminated not by any movement pre-existing in it, but at the presence of an illuminating body. And likewise, a sense power begins to sense not by any movement pre-existing in it, but at the requisite placing of a sensible object before it. Et ideo simul aliquis sentit et iam sensit, nihilominus tamen propter hoc non oportet quod sensibilia vel motus sensibilium absque successione perveniant ad sensus; manifeste enim apparet quod simul aliquis audit et audivit, et tamen sonus non statim, facto ictu qui causat sonum, pervenit ad auditum. Thus one simultaneously senses and already has sensed. Nevertheless it is not for this reason necessary that sensible objects, or movements of sensible objects, reach a sense power without succession. For it is clear that one simultaneously is hearing and has heard, and nevertheless sound does not reach hearing immediately when the blow that causes the sound is struck. Et hoc fit manifestum per transfigurationem literarum, quando alicuius locutio auditur ex longinquo, ac si sonus vocis literatae deferatur per medium successive: propter hoc enim audientes sonum non videntur auditu discrevisse literas prolatas, quia aer motus in medio transfiguratur, quasi admittens impressionem primi sonantis. Quod quidem contingit quandoque propter aliquam aliam aeris immutationem, sicut cum multis loquentibus non potest discerni quid aliquis eorum dicat propter hoc quod motus se invicem impediunt; quandoque vero contingit propter distantiam: sicut enim actio calefacientis in remotioribus debilitatur, ita etiam et immutatio aeris quae est a primo sonante, ex quo contingit quod ad illos qui sunt prope loquentem perfecte contingit sonus locutionis cum debita expressione litterarum, ad remotos autem cum quadam confusione. This is made clear by the reconfiguration of letters that occurs when someone’s speech is heard from a distance, indicating that the sound of the voice formed into letters is being carried successively through the midpoint. It is for this reason that those who hear the sound apparently have not by hearing distinguished the letters pronounced: because the air moved in the midpoint is reconfigured, as if losing the impression made by the one who first caused the sound. This sometimes happens because of some other alteration in the air, for example when, because many are speaking, it is impossible to make out what one of them is saying, for the movements impede one another. But sometimes it happens because of distance: for as the action of heating is weakened in what is farther away, so also does the alteration of the air by the one who first produces the sound, and as a result the sound of the speech may reach those who are near the speaker perfectly, with the requisite articulation of letters, but reach those who are farther away with some confusion. Videtur igitur similiter se habere et de colore et de lumine, quia etiam color et lumen non videntur quomodocumque sint disposita secundum situm, sed requiritur determinata distantia (sicut enim locutiones a remotis audiuntur absque discretione literarum, ita etiam corpora videntur a remotis absque discretione dispositionis singularum partium), nec est ita de relatione visus et visibilis sicut de relatione aequalitatis: ad hoc enim quod aliqua sint aequalia, non requiritur aliquis determinatus situs, sed qualitercumque varietur eorum situs, semper manent eodem modo aequalia nec differt utrum sint prope vel longe. Videtur ergo quod, sicut transfiguratio literarum manifestat sonum successive pervenire ad auditum quamvis postquam iam pervenerit simul audiatur, ita etiam imperfecta visio visibilium remotorum videtur significare quod color et lumen successive perveniant ad visum quamvis simul videantur. The case of color and light (446b9), then, seems to be similar, for color and light also cannot be seen by being positioned in just any way: rather, a determinate distance is required. For just as utterances are heard by those at a distance without distinction of the letters, so also bodies are seen by those at a distance without distinction of the arrangement of individual parts. The relation between the sense of sight and the visible object is not like the relation of equality: for no determinate location is required in order for things to be equal; rather, however their location varies, they always remain equal in the same way, and it makes no difference whether they are near or far. Therefore it seems that just as the reconfiguration of letters makes it clear that sound reaches the sense of hearing by succession, although once it has reached hearing, it is heard all at once; so the incomplete vision of remote visible objects seems to indicate that color and light reach the sense of sight by succession, although they are seen all at once. Deinde cum dicit: vel circa sonum quidem etc., ponit veram solutionem, ostendens differentiam visus ad alios duos sensus qui sunt per media exteriora, scilicet auditum et olfactum. Et dividitur in partes duas: Then, when he says on the other hand (446b13), he presents the true solution, showing the difference between sight and the other two senses that perceive through external media, namely hearing and smell. This is divided into two parts. primo namque assignat differentiam visus ad auditum et odoratum; First he gives the difference of sight from hearing and smell. secundo concludit propositum, ibi: rationabiliter autem etc. Second he concludes to his proposal, where he says but it is reasonable (447a8). Prima pars dividitur in duas secundum duas differentias quas assignat; The first part is divided into two according to the two differences he gives. secunda incipit ibi: omnino autem nec similiter etc. The second begins where he says in general, alteration and transfer (446b28).