Capitulum 17 Chapter 17 Simultaneous sensation continued Amplius si contrariorum motus contrarii, simul autem contraria in eodem et atomo non contingit esse, sub sensu autem uno contraria sunt, velud dulce amaro, non utique contingit sentire simul. Moreover, if movements of contraries are contrary; and contraries cannot simultaneously be in the same atomon; and there are contraries, for instance, sweet and bitter, under one sense power—then one cannot sense them simultaneously. Similiter autem palam quod neque quae non contraria: haec quidem enim albi sunt, haec vero nigri, et in aliis similiter, velud saporum hii quidem dulcis, hii vero amari. But likewise, clearly, neither can one simultaneously sense objects that are not contraries. For some belong to white and some to black. And likewise in other cases: for instance some flavors belong to sweet and some to bitter. Nec quae commixta simul: proportiones enim sunt oppositorum, velud dyapason et dyapente; nisi sicut unum sentiantur: sic autem una proportio extremitatum fit; aliter autem non. Nor can one simultaneously sense mixtures simultaneously, for the proportions belong to opposites, for instance the octave and the fifth; unless they are perceived as one, but thus one proportion is made of the extremes, but otherwise not. Erit enim simul haec quidem multi ad paucum vel imparis ad parem, haec autem pauci ad multum vel paris ad imparem. For there will be simultaneously many to few, or odd to even, or few to many, or even to odd. Si ergo plus adhuc distant ab invicem et differunt coelementariter quidem dicta, in alio autem genere, quam quae in eodem genere: dico autem puta dulce et album voco coelementaria, genere autem alia, dulce vero a nigro multo amplius specie differunt quam album. Adhuc utique minus continget ipsa simul sentire quam quae genere, quare si non haec, nec illa. If, then, the so-called “corresponding elements,” which are in different genera, stand apart and differ from one another still more than do objects in the same genus (I call sweet and white, for instance, corresponding elements in different genera, and sweet differs specifically from black much more than white does); then one can sense these simultaneously still less than those in one genus. So if not the former, then neither the latter. Quod autem dicunt quidam eorum qui circa symphonias, quod non simul quidem pertingunt soni, videntur autem et latent cum tempus insensibile fuerit, utrum recte dicitur vel non? Forte enim utique dicet quis et nunc ex hoc putare simul videre et audire, quia intermedia tempora latent. Some of those who discuss symphoniae say that sounds do not arrive simultaneously, but they seem to, and it escapes notice, since the time is insensible. Is it correct to say this or not? Perhaps someone will say that it is also because of this that one thinks that he simultaneously sees and hears, namely because the intervening lengths of time escape notice. Aut hoc non verum, neque contingit tempus esse insensibile nullum neque latere, sed omnia quaecunque contingit sentire. Or perhaps it is not true that any length of time can be insensible or escape notice: rather, absolutely all of them can be perceived. Si enim, quando ipse se ipsum sentit vel alium in continuo tempore, non contingit tunc latere quia est, est autem aliquod in continuo et tantum quantum omnino insensibile est, manifestum quod tunc latebit utique si est ipse ipsum, et quod videt et quod sentit et si sentit. For if, when one senses oneself or something else in a continuous length of time, it cannot escape his notice that it is existing; and something is existing in a continuous length of time; and it is so brief as to be completely insensible; it is clear that it will then escape his notice whether he himself is existing, and that he is seeing, and that he is sensing, and whether he is sensing. Amplius non utique erit nec tempus nec ulla res quae sentit in quo non sic, quia in huius aliquo, vel quia istius aliquid videt, si quidem est aliqua magnitudo et temporis et rei insensibilis omnino propter parvitatem. Moreover, there will be no length of time (and no thing that one senses) during which it is not the case that it is being sensed in some part of it (or that one sees some part of the thing)—if indeed there is some magnitude of time and of a thing that is insensible because of smallness. Si enim totam videt et sentit eodem continuo tempore, non eo quod in huius aliquo, auferatur quae GB, in qua non sentiebatur. Non ergo in huius aliquo vel istius aliquid, velud terram videt totam, quoniam hoc ipsius, et in anno ambulat, quoniam in hac parte ipsius. At vero in GB nihil sentit; eo ergo quod in huius aliquo, scilicet AG, sentit, dicitur totum sentire AB et totam. Eadem autem ratio et in AG: semper enim in aliquo et aliquid, totum autem non est sentire AGB. For if one is seeing and sensing the whole during the same continuous length of time not because one does so in some part of it—then let GB, in which it was not being sensed, be subtracted. Accordingly, one does not sense “during a part of it,” or “a part of it,” in the way that one sees the whole earth because one sees a part of it, and one walks during a year because one does so during this part of it. Rather, one senses nothing in GB. Therefore, it is because one senses it in a part, namely AG, that one is said to sense the whole of AB, and the whole thing. But the same account also applies to AG: it is always a case of “during a part of it,” and “a part of it,” and it is impossible to sense the whole of AGB. Omnia quidem igitur sensibilia sunt, sed non videntur quaecunque sunt: solis enim magnitudo videtur et quod quatuor cubitorum a longe; sed non videtur quantumcunque, sed aliquando indivisibile, videt autem non indivisibile. Dicta autem est causa in anterioribus de hoc. All things, then, are sensible, but do not appear to be everything that they are: the size of the sun appears from far away to be four cubits. A thing does not appear to be everything that it is: rather, sometimes it is indivisible, but one sees what is not indivisible. The cause of this has been stated in the foregoing. Quod quidem igitur nullum est tempus insensibile, manifestum ex hiis. Therefore it is clear from these remarks that no length of time is insensible. Amplius si contrariorum motus etc. Positis duabus rationibus ad ostendendum quod non contingit duos sensus simul sentire, hic ad idem ponit tertiam rationem, quae sumitur ex contrarietate sensibilium. Moreover, if movements of contraries (448a1). Having presented two arguments to show that it is impossible for two senses to sense simultaneously, here he presents a third argument for the same conclusion based on the contrariety of sensible objects. Et dicit quod immutationes quae sunt a contrariis sunt contrariae, sicut calefactio et infrigidatio, contraria autem non possunt simul esse in eodem atomo, id est indivisibili (in eodem enim divisibili possunt simul contraria esse secundum diversas partes); manifestum est autem quod ea quae cadunt sub sensu <uno> sunt contraria, sicut dulce et amarum; ergo non possunt simul sentiri. He says that alterations caused by contraries are contrary, for instance heating and cooling. But contraries cannot simultaneously be in the same “atomon”—that is, the same indivisible part (contraries can simultaneously be in the same divisible part with respect to different parts of it). But it is clear that objects under one sense power are contraries, for instance sweet and bitter. Therefore they cannot be sensed simultaneously. Et similis ratio est in his quae non sunt contraria, scilicet in mediis, quorum quaedam magis appropinquant ad unum extremum, quaedam magis ad aliud, sicut supra dictum est de coloribus et saporibus quod colorum mediorum quidam pertinent ad album et quidam ad nigrum, et similiter saporum mediorum quidam pertinent ad dulce, quidam ad amarum. The argument is similar in the case of objects that are not contraries, that is, intermediate objects, some of which more closely approach one extreme, and some the other. For instance, as was said above about colors and flavors, some intermediate colors pertain to white and some to black, and likewise some intermediate flavors pertain to sweet and some to bitter. Et eadem ratio est de omnibus commixtis, [quia diversae commixtiones habent quamdam contrarietatem] quia diversae commixtiones fiunt secundum diversas proportiones, diversae autem proportiones habent quamdam oppositionem ad invicem, ut patet in consonantiis quarum una dicitur diapason, quae consistit in dupla proportione quae est duorum ad unum, alia vero dicitur diapente, quae consistit in proportione sesquialtera quae est trium ad duo; ista, inquam, sic commixta diversis proportionibus non possunt simul sentiri, propter oppositionem proportionum, nisi forte duo sentiantur ut unum, quia sic fiet una proportio ex duabus extremitatibus. And the argument is the same in the case of all mixtures, for different mixtures have a contrariety between themselves because they are made in different proportions, and different proportions have an opposition to one another. This is clear in harmonies: one is called the octave, which consists in the double proportion, that of two to one; another is called the fifth, which consists in the sesquialteral proportion, that of three to two. Such things, I say, thus mixed together in different proportions, cannot be simultaneously sensed, because of the opposition between proportions—unless, perhaps, two are perceived as one, because thus one proportion will be made out of two extremes. Ostendit autem consequenter diversas proportiones esse oppositas secundum duplicem oppositionem quae in numeris invenitur, quarum una est secundum multum et paucum et secundum hoc opponuntur proportio dupli et proportio dimidii (nam proportio dupli est multi ad paucum, proportio vero dimidii est pauci ad multum); alia vero oppositio est secundum par et impar et secundum hoc opponuntur proportio dupla et sesquialtera (nam proportio dupla est duorum ad unum, quasi paris ad impar, unum enim est forma imparis numeri, sesquialtera autem proportio est trium ad duo, quod est imparis ad parem). Next he shows that different proportions are opposed according to the two kinds of opposition found in numbers. One is according to many and few, by which the proportion of double and the proportion of half are opposed: for the proportion of double is one of many to few, but the proportion of half is one of few to many. The other kind of opposition is according to even and odd, by which the double proportion and the sesquialteral proportion are opposed: for the double proportion is one of two to one, that is, of even to odd, but the sesquialteral proportion is of three to two, that is, of odd to even. Sic ergo patet quod non possunt simul sentiri quae cadunt sub eodem sensu; plus autem distant ad invicem quae coelementariter sibi correspondent in diverso genere existentia, puta dulce et album, quam ea quae sunt unius generis, quia ea quae sunt unius generis non distinguuntur specie nisi propter modum sentiendi, sicut album et nigrum, ea vero quae sunt diversorum generum possunt differre specie non solum ex parte sensus, sed etiam ex parte modi, sicut dulce a nigro plus differt quam album. Unde minus possunt simul sentiri, quod est quasi esse unum numero, ut supra habitum est; si igitur ea quae sunt unius generis propter contrarietatem non possunt simul sentiri, multo minus ea quae sunt diversorum generum possunt simul sentiri. Thus it is clear that objects falling under the same sense cannot be sensed simultaneously. But objects that correspond to one another as “corresponding elements” existing in different genera—for instance sweet and white—stand farther apart from one another than do objects belonging to one genus. For objects belonging to one genus, such as white and black, are specifically distinguished only because of the manner of sensing. But objects belonging to different genera can differ specifically not only from the point of view of the sense power, but also from the point of view of manner of sensing: for instance, sweet differs from black more than white does. Hence they are less able to be sensed simultaneously, which is, as it were, to be numerically one, as was established above (ch. 16, 447b24–25). Therefore, if objects belonging to one genus cannot, because of their contrariety, be sensed simultaneously, much less can objects belonging to different genera be sensed simultaneously. Deinde cum dicit: quod autem dicunt quidam etc., excludit quamdam falsam solutionem huius quaestionis. Then when he says some of those who discuss symphoniae (448a19), he eliminates a false solution of this question. Et primo narrat eam; First he relates it. secundo improbat, ibi: aut hoc non verum etc. Second he disproves it, where he says or perhaps it is not true (448a24). Dicit ergo primo quod quidam de symphoniis, id est de consonantiis musicis, tractantes, dixerunt quod soni consonantes non simul perveniunt ad auditum, sed videntur simul pervenire eo quod tempus medium est insensibile propter parvitatem, de quo potest esse dubium utrum recte dicatur vel non? Si enim hoc recte dicatur, poterit aliquis similiter in proposito dicere consentiens praemissis rationibus quod non est possibile simul videre et audire, sed tamen sensibiliter videtur ita contingere, quia latent nos tempora media visionis et auditionis. Accordingly he first says that some who treated of “symphoniae”—that is, musical harmonies—said that the harmonizing sounds do not reach the sense of hearing simultaneously, but that they seem to reach it simultaneously because the intervening time is insensible on account of its brevity. There might be doubt about this: is it correct to say this or not? If it is correct, someone who agrees with the arguments presented above will be able to say that, likewise, with respect to the question posed, it is not possible to simultaneously see and hear, although this does seem to the sense power to happen, because the intervening lengths of time between the vision and the hearing escape our notice. Deinde cum dicit: aut hoc non verum etc., improbat praedictam solutionem. Et circa hoc tria facit: Then when he says or perhaps it is not true (448a24), he disproves the above-mentioned solution. On this point he does three things. primo interimit id quod praedicta solutio supponit; First he eliminates something that the solution stated presupposes. secundo probat quod dixerat, ibi: si enim quando ipse etc.; Second he proves what he has said, where he says for if, when one senses oneself (448a26). tertio manifestat quid sit verum circa hoc, ibi: omnia quidem igitur etc. Third he clarifies what is true in the solution, where he says all things, then, are sensible (448b12). Dicit ergo primo quod non est verum quod praedicta solutio supponit, scilicet quod sit aliquod tempus insensibile vel latens sensum: nullum enim tempus est tale, sed omnia tempora contingit sentire. Accordingly he first says that something that the solution stated presupposes is not true, namely that there is a length of time that is insensible, or escapes the notice of the sense power. For no length of time is like this: rather, all lengths of time can be sensed. Deinde cum dicit: si enim quando ipse etc., probat quod dixerat duabus rationibus. Then when he says for if, when one senses oneself (448a26), he proves what he has said by two arguments. Circa quarum primam considerandum est quod tempus non sentitur quasi aliqua res permanens proposita sensui, sicut videtur color aut magnitudo, sed ex hoc sentitur tempus quia sentitur aliquid quod est in tempore; et ideo sequitur quod, si aliquod tempus non sit sensibile, quod id quod est in tempore illo non sit sensibile. Concerning the first of these, we must consider that time is not sensed as a permanent thing presented to a sense power in the way that color or size is presented to sight. Rather, time is sensed because something that is in time is sensed. It follows, then, that if there is some length of time that is insensible, what is in that length of time is insensible. Dicit ergo quod, si aliquando aliquis homo sentit se ipsum esse in aliquo continuo tempore, non contingit latere illud tempus esse; manifestum est autem quod homo vel aliquod aliud est in quodam continuo tempore, et quantumcumque dicas parvum tempus esse insensibile, manifestum est quod latebit hominem si ipse est in illo tempore, et latebit eum si in illo tempore videt vel sentit, quod est omnino inconveniens; ergo impossibile est aliquod tempus esse insensibile. Accordingly he says that if at some point, in some continuous length of time, a human being senses that he himself is existing, it cannot escape his notice that that length of time is existing. Now it is clear that the human being, or the something else, is existing in some continuous length of time. And however brief you say the insensible length of time is, it is clear that it will escape the human being’s notice that he himself is existing during that time, and it will escape his notice that he is seeing, or sensing, during that time, which is entirely unreasonable. Therefore it is impossible for a length of time to be insensible. Secundam rationem ponit ibi: amplius non utique erit etc. He presents the second argument where he says moreover, there will be no length of time (448a30). Circa quam primo considerandum est quod, sicut Philosophus dicit in V Physicorum, tripliciter dicitur aliquid movere aut moveri: Concerning this it must first be considered that, as the Philosopher says in Physics V, a thing is said to move or be moved in three ways: uno modo per accidens, ut si dicamus musicum ambulare; in one way accidentally, for instance, if we say that the one who is musical is walking; alio modo secundum partem, ut si dicamus hominem sanari quia oculus sanatur; in another way with respect to a part, for instance, if we say that a man is healed because his eye is healed;