Capitulum 5 Chapter 5 The nature of color De sensibilibus autem hiis quae secundum unumquodque sensitivum, puta dico colore et sono et odore et gustu et tactu, universaliter dictum est quae actio eorum in hiis quae de anima et quid operari secundum unumquodque sensitivorum. Quid autem oporteat dicere quodlibet eorum, scilicet quid color, quid sonus, quid odor, quid sapor, similiter autem et de tactu, considerandum est, et primum de colore. Concerning sensible objects, in relation to each sensitive part—I mean, for instance, color and sound and odor and taste and touch—it was said in a general way in the discussions On the Soul what their action is; and what it is to operate in relation to each sensitive part. But it is necessary to say what each of them is; that is, it must be considered what color is, what sound is, what odor is, what flavor is, and similarly also concerning touch. And first concerning color. Est quidem igitur unumquodque dupliciter dictum, hoc quidem actu, hoc vero potentia. Quid quidem igitur actu color et sonus, quomodo est idem vel alterum hiis qui secundum actum sensibus, puta visioni et auditioni, dictum est in eis quae de anima. Quid autem unumquodque eorum existens facit sensum et actum, nunc dicamus. Each, then, is spoken of in two ways: on one hand in actuality, on the other in potentiality. Accordingly, what color in actuality is, and sound, how they are the same as or other than the sense powers in actuality, namely seeing and hearing, has been said in the discussions On the Soul. But let us now say what each of them is that it should cause sensing and actuality. Quemadmodum igitur dictum est de lumine in illis, quod sit color perspicui secundum accidens. Quando enim inest aliquod ignitum in perspicuo, presentia quidem lumen est, privatio vero tenebrae. Accordingly, as was said about light in those discussions, it is the color of the transparent accidentally. For when something lit up exists in the transparent, the presence is light, and the privation darkness. Quod autem dicimus perspicuum non est proprium aeris vel aquae vel alicuius sic dictorum corporum, sed est quaedam communis natura et virtus. Quae separata quidem non est, in hiis vero est et in aliis corporibus, in hiis quidem magis, in hiis vero minus. But what we call the transparent is not a property of air or water or any of the bodies mentioned, but is a common nature and power. It is not separate, but it is present in these and in other bodies, in some to a greater extent, in some to a lesser. Quemadmodum ergo et corporum necesse est ultimum esse, et huius. Luminis quidem igitur natura in indeterminato perspicuo est; ipsius autem quod in corporibus perspicui ultimum quod quidem erit utique aliquid, palam, quod autem hoc sit color, ex accidentibus manifestum: namque color in extremitate aut extremitas est. Unde Pictagorici epiphaniam colorem vocabant. Est quidem enim in corporis extremitate, sed non est extremitas corporis. Therefore, as there is necessarily a limit of bodies, so there also is of this. Now the nature of light is in the unlimited transparent. But it is obvious that there will be a limit of the transparent that is in bodies, and that this is color is clear from what happens: for color is on the limit or is the limit. Hence the Pythagoreans called color an “epiphany”; for it is on the limit of a body, but it is not the limit of the body. Sed eandem naturam oportet existimare quae exterius coloratur, hanc et interius. Videntur autem aer et aqua colorata: et enim aurora tale est. Sed ibi quidem, quoniam in indeterminato, non eundem colorem habet accedentibus prope et longe, nec aer nec mare; in corporibus vero, nisi continens faciat transmutationem, determinata est et fantasia coloris. Manifestum igitur quod idem et ibi et hic susceptivum coloris est. Perspicuum ergo secundum quod existit in corporibus (inest autem aut plus aut minus in omnibus) colores facit participari. Quoniam autem in extremitate color, huius utique extremitas aliqua erit. Now one must think that it is the same nature that is colored from without and intrinsically. Air and water appear as colored things, for the dawn is such a thing. But in this case, because it is in something indeterminate, neither the air nor the sea has the same color to those who approach close up and from afar. But in bodies, unless something containing makes a change, there is a determinate fantasia of color. Therefore it is clear that both in the former and in the latter it is the same thing that is receptive of color. Therefore the transparent, according as it exists in bodies—and it exists in all of them, to a greater or lesser extent—is what causes colors to be participated in. But because color is on the limit, it will be a limit of this. Quare color utique erit perspicui extremitas in determinato corpore. Therefore color will be the limit of the transparent in a determinate body. Et ipsorum autem perspicuorum, puta aquae et si quid aliud tale, quorumcunque videtur aliquis color proprius esse, secundum extremitatem similiter omnibus inest. And in transparent things such as water and any other such thing, and in whatever seems to have a color of its own—in all these it is likewise at the limit. De sensibilibus autem hiis etc. Postquam Philosophus considerationem de sensibus animalium ad organa sensuum applicavit, hic applicat ea ad ipsa sensibilia. Concerning sensible objects (439a6). After the Philosopher has applied the consideration about sense powers of animals to sense-organs, here he applies it to sensible objects themselves. Et primo dicit de quo est intentio; First he states his intention. secundo exequitur propositum, ibi: quemadmodum igitur dictum est de lumine etc. Second he carries out his proposal, where he says accordingly, as was said about light (439a18). Circa primum duo facit: On the first point he does two things. primo proponit intentum; First he proposes his intention. secundo manifestat quod dixerat, ibi: est quidem igitur unumquodque etc. Second he clarifies what he said, where he says each, then, is spoken of in two ways (439a12). Dicit ergo primo quod de sensibilibus propriis quae sentiuntur secundum unumquodque sensitivum, id est secundum singula organa sensuum (quod dicitur ad differentiam sensibilium communium), scilicet de colore, sono et odore, quae sentiuntur per visum, <auditum> et odoratum, et de gustu et tactu, id est de sensibilibus horum sensuum, dictum est in libro De anima universaliter et quomodo agunt in sensum et qualis sit operatio sensus secundum unumquodque organum immutatum a praedicto sensibili (dictum est enim in II De anima quod sensus est potentia sensibile et quod sensibilia faciunt sensum esse in actu). Sed nunc considerandum est quid sit quodlibet sensibile secundum se ipsum, scilicet quid sit color, quid sonus, quid odor, quid sapor, et similiter de tactu, id est de sensibilibus tactus, sed primum dicendum est de colore, qui est obiectum visus, eo quod visus est spiritualior inter omnes sensus. Accordingly he first speaks of proper sensible objects, those perceived in relation to each sensitive part, that is, each individual sense-organ, which he says to distinguish them from common sensibles. The proper sensibles are color, sound, and odor, which are sensed through sight, hearing, and smell; and taste and touch—that is, the objects of these senses. He says that it was said in On the Soul in a general way both how these act on a sense power and the nature of the sense power’s operation in relation to each organ affected by the above-mentioned sensible objects. For it was said in On the Soul 2 that a sense power is a sensible object in potentiality, and that sensible objects make a sense power be in actuality. But now it must be considered what each sensible object is in itself, that is, what color is, what sound is, what odor is, what flavor is, and similarly concerning touch—that is, the objects of touch. But first color, which is the object of sight, must be discussed, because sight is the most spiritual of the senses. Non est autem per hoc intelligendum quod de omnibus his sensibilibus in hoc libro determinare intendat, sed quod omnium horum sensibilium consideratio necessaria sit ad propositam intentionem. Sed tamen sensibilia tactus sunt vel proprietates elementorum, scilicet calidum, frigidum, humidum et siccum, de quibus determinatum est in libro De generatione, vel sunt proprietates corporum distinctorum, sicut durum et molle et alia huiusmodi, de quibus determinatum est in libro Meteororum; unde nunc restat determinare de tribus, scilicet de colore, odore et sapore: de sono enim determinatum est in libro De anima, eo quod eadem est ratio generationis soni et immutationis auditivi organi a sono. Qualiter autem immutentur organa sensuum a sensibilibus, pertinet ad considerationem libri De anima. It is not to be understood by this that he intends to make a determination about all these sensible objects in this book, but rather that consideration of them all is necessary to the proposed intention. But objects of touch are either properties of elements, namely hot, cold, moisture, and dryness, about which a determination was made in the book On Generation and Corruption; or they are properties of individual bodies, such as hardness and softness, and so on, about which a determination was made in the book the Meteorology. So what is left now is to make a determination about three things, namely color, odor, and flavor. For a determination about sound was made in the book On the Soul, because the account of the production of sound is the same as the account of the alteration of the auditory organ by sound, and the way in which sense-organs are altered by sensible objects belongs to the consideration made in the book On the Soul. Deinde cum dicit: est quidem igitur etc., exponit quod dictum est, scilicet quod considerandum quid sit color et sapor etc. Then, when he says each, then, is spoken of in two ways (439a12), he explains what was said, namely that it must be considered what color is, what flavor is, etc. Unumquodque horum enim dupliciter est, uno quidem modo prout sentitur in actu, alio vero modo prout est sensibile in potentia. Quid autem sit unumquodque eorum secundum actum, scilicet secundum quod est color actu perceptus a sensu vel sapor vel quodcumque aliud sensibile, dictum est in libro De anima, quomodo scilicet sit unumquodque eorum idem vel <alterum> sensui secundum actum, scilicet visioni vel auditioni, quia videlicet visibile in actu est idem visioni in actu, visibile autem in potentia non est idem visui in potentia. Ergo quid unumquodque sensitivum sit in actu, dictum est in libro De anima, in quo determinatum est de sensibus in actu; sed quid sit unumquodque eorum secundum se ipsum, quod natum est facere sensitivum in actu, est nunc dicendum in hoc libro. For each of these exists in two ways: in one way inasmuch as it is sensed in actuality, and in another way inasmuch as it is sensible in potentiality. What each of them is according to actuality—that is, according as color, flavor, or any other sensible object, is in actuality perceived by sense—has been said in On the Soul. That is, it was said how each of them is the same as or other than a sense power in actuality, such as seeing or hearing: for the visible in actuality is the same as seeing in actuality, but the visible in potentiality is not the same as sight in potentiality. Accordingly what each of the sensible objects is in actuality was said in On the Soul, where a determination was made about the sense powers in actuality. But what each thing that is of such a nature as to cause the sense power to be in actuality is in itself must be said now, in the present book. Deinde cum dicit: quemadmodum igitur dictum est etc., determinat de sensibilibus secundum modum praetactum. Then, when he says accordingly, as was said about light (439a18), he makes a determination about sensible objects in the order already established: Et primo de colore; first color; secundo de sapore, ibi: de odore vero et sapore etc.; second flavor, where he says odor and flavor must be discussed (ch. 8, 440b28); tertio de odore, ibi: eodem vero modo oportet intelligere etc. and third odor, where he says odors must be understood in the same way (ch. 11, 442b27). Prima autem pars dividitur in duas partes: The first part is divided into two parts. in prima ostendit quid sit color in communi; In the first he shows what color in general is. in secunda parte determinat de differentiis colorum, ibi: est ergo inesse in perspicuo etc. In the second he makes a determination about differences among colors, where he says accordingly, what causes light (ch. 6, 439b14). Circa primum duo facit: On the first point he does two things. primo proponit principia coloris; First he presents the principles of color. secundo investigat coloris definitionem ex huiusmodi principiis, ibi: quemadmodum ergo et corporum etc. Second he investigates the definition of color on the basis of these principles, where he says therefore, as there is necessarily a limit of bodies (439a25). Est autem duplex coloris principium, unum quidem formale, scilicet lumen, aliud materiale, scilicet perspicuum; Now there are two principles of color: one is formal, namely light; the other is material, namely the transparent. primo ergo tangit principium formale, scilicet lumen; Accordingly he first touches on the formal principle, light; secundo principium materiale, scilicet perspicuum, ibi: quod autem dicimus perspicuum etc. and second on the material principle, the transparent, where he says but what we call the transparent (439a21). Dicit ergo primo quod, sicut dictum est in libro De anima, lumen est color perspicui; quod quidem dicitur secundum quamdam proportionem eo quod sicut color est forma et actus corporis colorati, ita lumen est forma et actus perspicui, differt tamen quantum ad hoc quod corpus coloratum in se ipso habet causam sui coloris, sed corpus perspicuum non habet lumen <nisi> ab alio; et ideo dicit quod lumen est color perspicui secundum accidens, id est per aliud, non quin lumen sit actus perspicui in quantum huiusmodi. Quod autem sit actus eius secundum aliud, manifestat per hoc quod quando aliquod corpus ignitum, id est actu lucidum, adest perspicuo, ex praesentia eius fit lumen in perspicuo, ex privatione vero fiunt tenebrae. Non sic autem de colore, quia color manet in corpore colorato quocumque praesente vel absente, licet non sit actu visibilis sine lumine. Accordingly he first says that, as was said in the book On the Soul, light is the color of the transparent. He says this according to an analogy (proportio): as color is the form and actuality of a colored body, so light is the form and actuality of the transparent. But they are different inasmuch as a colored body has the cause of its color in itself, but a transparent body has its light only from something else. This is why he says that light is the color of the transparent accidentally, that is, through something else, and not that light is the actuality of the transparent as such. He shows that light is the actuality of the transparent through something else in the following way. When a body that is lit up—that is, bright in actuality—is present to the transparent, light is caused in the transparent by the presence of that body, and darkness by its privation. But it is not so with color, because the color remains in a colored body whatever is present to or absent from it, although it may not be in actuality visible without light. Deinde cum dicit: quod autem dicimus perspicuum etc., determinat de perspicuo. Then, when he says but what we call the transparent (439a21), he makes a determination about the transparent. Et dicit quod hoc quod dicitur perspicuum non est proprium vel aeris vel aquae vel alicuius huiusmodi corporum, sicut est vitrum et alia corpora transparentia, sed est quaedam natura communis, quae in multis corporibus invenitur, id est quaedam naturalis proprietas in multis inventa, quam etiam virtutem nominat in quantum est quoddam principium visionis. Et quia Plato ponebant communia, sicut sunt separata secundum rationem, ita etiam separata secundum esse, ideo ad hoc excludendum subiungit quod natura perspicuitatis non est aliqua natura separata, sed est in his corporibus sensibilibus, scilicet in aere et aqua, et etiam in aliis, in quibusdam quidem magis, in quibusdam vero minus. He says that what is called the transparent is not a property of either air or water or any such body—for instance glass and other transparent bodies—but is a common “nature” found in many bodies—that is, a natural property found in many things—one that he also calls a “power” (virtus) inasmuch as it is a principle of vision. Now Plato held that, just as what is common is separate in intelligibility (ratio), so it is also separate in existence (esse). Therefore, in order to eliminate this position, he adds that the nature of the transparent is not a separate nature, but is in these sensible bodies—namely air and water—and also others, in some to a greater extent, and in some to a lesser.