Capitulum 2 Chapter 2 Memory's part of the soul Quoniam autem de fantasia prius in hiis quae sunt de anima dictum est, et intelligere non est sine fantasmate. We have spoken, however, about imagination in the books on the soul, and said that understanding does not exist without an image. Accidit enim eadem passio intellectui quae quidem et in describendo: ibi enim nulla utentes quantitate trigoni determinata, tamen finitam secundum quantitatem describimus; et intelligens similiter, etsi non intelligat quantum, ponitur ante oculos quantum, intelligit autem non secundum quod quantum est. Si autem natura sit quantorum, infinitorum autem, ponitur tamen quantum determinatum, intelligit autem secundum quod quantum solum. For the same affection occurs in the case of the intellect as in the case of drawing: though using a triangle without determinate quantity we will still draw it quantitatively finite; and likewise even if one who understands something does not understand how big it is, nevertheless something of some size is put before his eyes, even though he understands it not according to how big it is. Even if nature contained things of infinite size, nevertheless something of determinate size is put before him and he understands it only as being of some size or other. Propter quam igitur causam non contingit intelligere nihil sine continuo neque sine ratione temporis, alia ratio. Hence the reason why it is not possible to understand anything without a continuum nor to understand beings without the notion of time is another argument. Magnitudinem autem et motum cognoscere necesse quo et tempus. Et fantasma communis sensus passio est. Quare manifestum quod primo sensitivo horum cognitio est. Memoria autem, et quae est intelligibilium, non sine fantasmate est. Quare intellectivi secundum accidens utique erit, per se autem primi sensitivi. It is necessary, however, to know magnitude and motion, whereby time, too, is known. And the image is an affection of the common sense. Hence clearly knowledge of these belongs to the prime sensitive power. Memory, however, and that which is of the intelligibles, does not exist without an image. Hence it will belong to the intellective part of the soul only by accident, but to the first sensitive by itself. Unde et alteris quibusdam inest animalium, et non solum homini et habentibus opinionem et prudentiam. Si autem intellectivarum aliqua partium esset, non utique inesset multis aliorum animalium, forte autem nulli mortalium. Hence it also exists in certain other animals and not just in man and in those that partake of opinion and prudence. If, however, it were any of the intellective parts of the soul, it would not exist in many of the animals other than man, perhaps indeed in none of those that are mortal. Quoniam neque nunc omnibus, propter id quod non omnia temporis sensum habent: semper enim cum agat memoria, sicut et prius diximus, quoniam vidit hoc aut audivit aut didicit, simul sentit quia prius; prius autem et posterius in tempore sunt. As it stands, it does not belong to all, because not all have the sense of time. For, as we have said before, whenever memory acts, it at the same time always senses that it has seen or heard or learned this thing before. The before and the after, however, are in time. Cuius quidem igitur eorum quae sunt animae memoria sit, manifestum, quoniam quidem cuius et fantasia est; et sunt memorabilia per se quidem quorum est fantasia, secundum accidens autem quaecunque non sine fantasia. Hence it is clear to which part of the soul memory belongs, because in fact it is the same as that to which imagination belongs, and there are some things that are memorable by themselves, namely, those of which there is imagination; and others are memorable by accident, namely, whatever do not exist without imagination. Quoniam autem de fantasia etc. Postquam Philosophus ostendit quid est memoria, hic ostendit ad quam partem animae pertineat. Et circa hoc duo facit: We have spoken, however, about imagination (449b30). After the Philosopher shows what memory is, he goes on to show to what part of the soul it belongs. He does two things in this regard. primo praemittit quiddam quod est necessarium ad propositi manifestationem; First he presents what is needed for explaining what he has set out to do. secundo manifestat propositum, ibi: magnitudinem autem et motum etc. Second he explains the thing he set out to do, where he says it is necessary, however, to know (450a9). Circa primum tria facit: Concerning the first of these topics he does three things. primo praemittit quod intendit; First he sets out his intention. secundo manifestat quod dixerat per exemplum, ibi: accidit enim eadem passio etc.; Second, by using an example, he explains what he has said, where he says for the same affection occurs (450a1). tertio ostendit quid circa hoc sit alibi manifestandum, ibi: propter quam igitur causam etc. Third, he points out a related matter that must be considered elsewhere, where he says hence the reason why (450a7). Proponit ergo primo quod in libro De anima dictum est de phantasia quid sit, quia scilicet est motus factus a sensu secundum actum; in eodem etiam libro dictum est quod non contingit hominem sine phantasmate intelligere. Accordingly he first brings up what was said in On the Soul about what the imagination is, namely that it is a motion brought about by an activated sense power. It was also said in the same book that it is not possible for a man to understand anything without an image. Deinde cum dicit: accidit enim etc., manifestat hoc quod ultimo dixerat. Then, when he says for the same affection occurs (450a1), he explains what he has just stated. Posset enim alicui videri inconveniens si non possit homo sine phantasmate intelligere, cum phantasma sit similitudo rei corporalis, intelligere autem sit universalium, quae a particularibus abstrahuntur; et ideo ad huius manifestationem inducit quoddam exemplum, dicens quod ita accidit circa intellectum, quantum ad hoc quod indiget phantasmate, sicut accidit in descriptionibus figurarum geometriae, in quibus describitur quidem triangulus alicuius determinatae quantitatis, tamen geometra in sua demonstratione non utatur aliqua determinata quantitate trianguli; similiter et homini volenti intelligere rem aliquam proponitur ante oculos phantasma alicuius determinatae quantitatis, utpote singularis, puta volenti intelligere hominem occurrit imaginatio alicuius hominis bicubiti, sed intellectus intelligit hominem in quantum est homo, non autem in quantum habet hanc quantitatem. For it might seem unreasonable to someone for a man to be unable to understand anything without an image, since an image is a likeness of a bodily thing, whereas understanding is of universals, which are abstracted from particulars. To explain this difficulty he introduces an example, saying that what occurs in the case of the intellect with reference to its needing an image is like what occurs in the drawings of geometrical figures. In the latter a triangle of some determinate quantity is indeed drawn even though in its demonstration geometry does not use any determinate quantity of triangle. Likewise, too, in the case of a man who wants to understand some things, namely, an image of a definite quantity, i.e. of a singular, is set before his eyes; for example, an image of a man two cubits tall might come to mind when one wants to understand man, but the intellect understands man inasmuch as he is man, not inasmuch as he has this quantity. Sed quia intellectus potest intelligere naturam quantitatis, ideo subiungit quod, si aliqua quae debent intelligi sunt secundum suam naturam quanta, puta linea, superficies et numerus, non tamen finita, id est determinata determinatione singularitatis, nihilominus tamen ponitur ante oculos phantasma quanti determinati, sicut volenti intelligere lineam occurrit phantasma lineae bipedalis, sed intellectus intelligit eam solum secundum naturam quantitatis, non secundum quod est bipedalis. But since the intellect can understand the nature of quantity, he adds that if the things to be understood are, in their own nature, quantities, e.g. line, surface, or number, but are not finite (i.e. determined as singulars), an image of a definite size is nevertheless set before one’s eyes. In this way, an image of a line two feet long comes to mind in one who wants to understand line, but the intellect understands it only in its nature as a quantity and not its being two feet long. Deinde cum dicit: propter quam igitur causam etc., ostendit quid <alii> considerationi reservetur. Et dicit quod ad aliam rationem pertinet assignare causam quare nihil homo potest intelligere sine continuo <et> tempore. Then, when he says hence the reason why (450a7), he shows what will be set aside for another consideration. He says that it is the task of another discussion to identify the cause of a man’s being unable to understand anything apart from the continuum and time. Quod quidem accidit in quantum nihil potest homo intelligere sine phantasmate: phantasma enim oportet quod sit cum continuo et tempore, eo quod est similitudo rei singularis quae est hic et nunc. Quare autem homo non possit intelligere sine phantasmate, de facili potest assignari ratio quantum ad primam acceptionem specierum intelligibilium, quae a phantasmatibus abstrahuntur, secundum doctrinam Aristotelis in III De anima. Sed experimento patet quod etiam ille qui iam acquisivit scientiam intelligibilem per species intellectas non potest actu considerare illud cuius scientiam habet nisi occurrat ei aliquod phantasma, et inde est quod laeso organo imaginationis impeditur homo non solum ab intelligendo aliqua de novo, sed etiam a considerando ea quae prius intellexit, ut patet in phreneticis. This happens in fact insofar as man can understand nothing without an image; for an image is necessarily accompanied by the continuum and time, because an image is a likeness of a singular thing existing here and now. The reason why man cannot understand without an image can easily be identified in the case of his first acquisition of intelligible species, which, according to Aristotle’s teaching in the third book of On the Soul, are abstracted from images. But it is clear from experience that he who has already acquired intelligible knowledge through an intellectually understood species also cannot actually consider that of which he has his knowledge, unless some image comes to mind. This is why a man with a damaged organ of imagination is kept not only from knowing things for the first time, but also from considering the things he knew before, as is clear in the case of the insane. Posset autem ad hoc aliquis dicere quod species intelligibiles non manent in intellectu possibili humano nisi quamdiu actu intelligit, postquam autem desiit actu intelligere, [pereunt] cessant species intelligibiles esse in intellectu, per modum quo cessat lumen esse in aere apud absentiam corporis illuminantis; et ideo necesse est, si intellectus velit de novo intelligere, quod iterum convertat se ad phantasmata ut acquirat species intelligibiles. Now at this point someone might wish to say that the intelligible species do not remain in the human possible intellect except while a man is actually understanding something; but after one ceases actually to understand, they vanish and the intelligible species cease to be in the intellect, just as light ceases to be in the air in the absence of any illuminating body, and hence if the intellect wishes to renew its understanding, it must turn again toward the images in order to acquire the intelligible species. Sed hoc est expresse contra verba Aristotelis in III De anima, ubi dicit quod, cum intellectus possibilis fiat singula intelligibilia, quod est per species eorum, tunc etiam est in potentia ad intelligendum in actu; repugnat etiam rationi, quia species intelligibiles recipiuntur in intellectu possibili immobiliter secundum modum ipsius. But this expressly contradicts the words of Aristotle in the third book of On the Soul, where he says that when the possible intellect becomes each of the intelligible things (which is accomplished through their species) at that point it is able to understand them in act. This position is also repugnant to reason, because the intelligible species are received in the possible intellect unchangeably, as is characteristic of an intellectual principle. Quod autem intellectus possibilis habeat species intelligibiles etiam cum actu non intelligit, non est sicut in potentiis sensitivis, in quibus propter conditionem organi corporalis aliud est recipere impressionem, quod facit sentire in actu, et aliud retinere etiam quando res actu non sentiuntur, ut obiicit Avicenna, Now the way in which the possible intellect possesses the intelligible species, even when it is not actually understanding anything, is not the same as that in which the sensible species are possessed in the sensitive powers: in them, owing to the composition of the bodily organ, it is one thing to receive an impression, which makes for actual sensing, and another to retain it even when the things are not actually being sensed, as Avicenna objects. sed contingit propter diversum gradum essendi formarum intelligibilium vel secundum potentiam puram, sicut ante invenire vel addiscere, vel secundum actum purum, sicut quando actu intelligit, vel medio modo inter potentiam et actum, quod est esse in habitu. The possession of the intelligible species comes about rather because of the diverse levels of being of the intelligible forms: either according to pure potency, e.g. in discovering or learning; or according to pure act, as when one is actually understanding something; or else in a manner intermediate between potency and act, as in a habit. Non ergo propter hoc solum indiget intellectus possibilis humanus phantasmate ut acquirat intelligibiles species, sed etiam eas quodam modo in phantasmatibus inspiciat; et hoc est quod dicitur in III De anima: species igitur in phantasmatibus intellectivum intelligit. Hence the human possible intellect needs an image not only to acquire intelligible species but it also in a way looks at them within the images. This is also what is said in the third book of On the Soul: the intellective power therefore understands the species in the images. Huius autem ratio est quia operatio proportionatur virtuti et essentiae, intellectivum autem hominis est in sensitivo, sicut dicitur in II De anima, et ideo propria operatio eius est intelligere intelligibilia in phantasmatibus, sicut intellectus substantiae separatae operatio est intelligere res secundum se intellectas. The reason for this is that activity is proportionate to power and essence. But the intellective power of man does exist in the sensitive part of the soul, as is said in the second book of On the Soul. Hence its proper operation is to understand intelligible things in images, just as the activity of the intellect of a separate substance is to understand things known in themselves. Et ideo causa huius reddenda est a metaphysico, ad quem pertinet considerare diversos gradus intellectuum. This is why the cause of this must be assigned by the metaphysician, to whom the task of considering the various levels of the intelligences belongs. Deinde cum dicit: magnitudinem autem et motum etc., ostendit ad quam partem animae pertineat memoria. Then, when he says it is necessary, however (450a9), he shows to what part of the soul the memory belongs. Et primo per rationem; He does so first by an argument; secundo per signa, ibi: unde et alteris etc.; second through signs, where he says hence it also exists (450a15). tertio concludit propositum, ibi: cuius quidem igitur etc. Third he draws the intended conclusion, where he says hence it is clear (450a22). Dicit ergo primo quod necesse est quod eadem parte animae cognoscatur magnitudo et motus qua et cognoscitur tempus: haec enim tria se consequuntur tam in divisione quam in eo quod est esse infinitum et finitum, ut probatur in VI Physicorum; Accordingly he says first that it is necessary that magnitude and the motion by which time too is known should be known by the same part of the soul. For these three follow each other both in division and in being finite and infinite, as is proven in the sixth book of the Physics. magnitudo autem cognoscitur sensu: est enim unum de sensibilibus communibus; similiter autem et motus, praecipue localis, cognoscitur in quantum cognoscitur distantia magnitudinis; tempus autem cognoscitur in quantum cognoscitur prius et posterius in motu; unde haec tria sensu percipi possunt. Dupliciter autem aliquid sensu percipitur: uno quidem modo per ipsam immutationem sensus a sensibili, et sic cognoscuntur tam sensibilia propria quam etiam communia a sensibus propriis et a sensu communi; alio modo cognoscitur aliquid quodam secundario motu qui relinquitur ex prima immutatione sensus a sensibili, qui quidem motus remanet etiam quandoque post absentiam sensibilium et pertinet ad phantasiam, ut habitum est in libro De anima. Phantasma autem quod apparet per huiusmodi immutationem secundariam est passio sensus communis: consequitur enim totam immutationem sensus, quae incipit a sensibus propriis et terminatur ad sensum communem. Unde manifestum est quod tria praedicta, scilicet magnitudo, motus et tempus, secundum quod in phantasmate comprehenduntur, cognoscuntur per sensum communem. Now magnitude is known by the sense power, since it is one of the common sensibles; and likewise motion, too, especially local motion, is known inasmuch as the distance of a magnitude is known; and time is known inasmuch as a before and an after in motion is known. Hence these three can be perceived by the sense power. Now there are two ways in which something is perceived by the sense power. In one way, it can be perceived through the very changing of the sense power effected by the sensible object; both the proper and also the common sensibles are known in this way both by their proper senses as well as by the common sense. In the other way, something is known by a sort of secondary motion that is left over from the first change of the sense power by the sensible object; this movement sometimes remains even after the disappearance of the sensible objects and pertains to the imagination, as is held in On the Soul. Moreover, the image that appears through such a secondary change is an affection of the common sense: for it is consequent upon the whole change of the sense power. Such a change begins with the proper senses and ends at the common sense. Hence clearly these three, viz. magnitude, motion, and time, are known through the common sense, since they are grasped in an image. Memoria autem, non solum sensibilium, puta cum aliquis memoratur se sensisse, sed etiam intelligibilium, puta cum aliquis memoratur se intellexisse, non est sine phantasmate: sensibilia enim, postquam praetereunt, a sensu non percipiuntur quin sint in phantasmate, intelligere etiam non est sine phantasmate, ut supra habitum est. Unde concludit quod memoria sit intellectivae partis animae per accidens, sed <per> se sit primi sensitivi, <scilicet> sensus communis. Dictum est enim supra quod intellectui proponitur in phantasmate quantum determinatum, licet intellectus secundum se consideret rem absolute; ad memoriam autem pertinet apprehensio temporis secundum determinationem quamdam, secundum scilicet distantiam in praeterito ab hoc praesenti nunc; unde per se pertinet memoria ad apparitionem phantasmatis, per accidens autem ad iudicium intellectus. Memory, however—not only the memory of sensibles, as when one remembers that he has sensed something, but also of intelligibles, as when one remembers that he has understood something—does not exist without an image: for after the sensibles are gone, they are not perceived by the sense power unless they exist in an image. There is also no act of understanding without an image, as was held above. Hence he concludes that memory belongs to the intellective part of the soul by accident, but by itself it belongs to the first sensitive, i.e. the common sense. For it was said above (450a4–6) that a certain determinate size is put before the intellect although the intellect by itself considers the thing absolutely; but it does pertain to the memory to apprehend time with respect to a certain determinateness, namely a distance in the past from this present moment. Hence memory by itself pertains to the preparation of an image, but by accident it pertains to the judgment of the intellect.