Capitulum 5 Chapter 5 How recollection occurs Contingunt autem reminiscentiae quoniam aptus natus est hic motus iam post hunc; si quidem enim ex necessitate, manifestum quod, cum moveatur illo, hoc movebitur; si autem non ex necessitate sed ex consuetudine, ut ad multum movebitur. Accidit autem quosdam semel consuevisse velocius quam alios multotiens motos. Unde quaedam semel videntes magis memoramur quam altera multotiens. Recollections happen since this motion is now naturally apt after this one; for if it is of necessity, it is manifest that, when it is moved with that one, it will be moved by this; but, if not of necessity but from custom, it will be moved as it were much. It comes about, however, that certain ones have become accustomed more quickly once, than others moved several times. Hence we remember some things more on seeing them once, than others many times. Cum ergo reminiscimur, movemur secundum quaendam priorum motuum, quousque utique moveamur post quem ille consuevit. Unde et quod consequenter venamur meditantes a nunc aut alio aliquo, et a simili aut contrario aut propinquo. Propter hoc fit reminiscentia: motus enim horum, horum quidem idem, horum autem simul, illorum autem partem habent, quare reliquum parvum quod motum est post illud. Quaerunt quidem igitur sic, et non quaerentes autem sic reminiscuntur, cum post alterum motum ille fiat; ut autem secundum multa alteris factis motibus quales diximus fiebat ille. Hence, when we recollect we are moved according to one of the prior motions, until we be moved after that one was customary. Hence, too, we are made to come to what is subsequently by meditating from now or some other point and from the similar, the contrary, or the proximate. Recollection comes about because of this: for the motions are of these, of these, the same; of others, however, at the same time; of others, they have a part, so that the remainder is little which has been moved after that one. Therefore they seek in this way, and, not seeking, they still recollect in this way, when that motion comes into being after the other one; but it used to come about when the other motions such as we have spoken of had come about, as it were, much. Nihil autem oportet intendere quae procul sunt, quomodo memoremur, sed non quae prope; manifestum enim quod idem modus aliqualiter. Dico autem quomodo dicit quod consequenter, non praequirens neque reminiscens; consuetudine enim consecuntur motus hic post hunc; et cum igitur reminisci voluerit, hoc faciet: quaeret accipere principium motus, post quod ille erit. It is not at all necessary to attend to how we remember those that are distant but not those that are near; for it is obvious that the method is somehow the same. Now I say how it says “that consequently”, neither inquiring in advance nor recollecting; but this motion is by custom consequent after this one; and therefore when he may want to recollect, this is what he does: he tries to grasp the starting point of a motion after which there will be that one. Unde citissime et optime fiunt a principio reminiscentiae: sicut enim se habent res ad invicem in eo quod consequenter, sic et motus. Hence recollections come about in the quickest and best way from the starting point: for as things are related to each other in that which is consequently, so too are the motions. Et sunt magis reminiscibilia quaecunque ordinationem habent aliquam, sicut mathemata; quae autem prave, graviter. And whatever things have an ordering, such as mathemes, are more recollectible; but those that are badly, with difficulty. Contingunt autem reminiscentiae etc. Postquam Philosophus inquisivit quomodo reminiscentia se habeat ad alia quae ad cognitionem pertinent, hic incipit manifestare reminiscendi modum. Recollections happen (451b10). After the Philosopher has inquired into how recollection is related to the other things that pertain to cognition, here he begins to explain the manner in which recollecting takes place. Et primo manifestat modum reminiscendi; First he explains the manner of recollecting. secundo ostendit differentiam inter memoriam et reminiscentiam, ibi: quod quidem igitur non idem sunt etc. Second he points to the difference between memory and recollection where he says now, then, that those with good memories (Ch. 8, 453a4). Circa primum duo facit: Concerning the first topic he does two things. primo ostendit modum reminiscendi quantum ad res quarum reminiscimur; He shows how recollecting takes place first with regard to the things one remembers; secundo quantum ad tempus (reminiscentia enim concernit tempus, sicut et memoria), et hoc ibi: maxime autem oportet cognoscere etc. and second with regard to the time (for recollection is concerned with time, just as memory is), where he says it is most necessary, however, to know time (Ch. 7, 452b7). Circa primum duo facit: With respect to the first topic he does two things. primo proponit causam reminiscendi; First he sets out the cause of recollecting. secundo ostendit modum quo proceditur in reminiscendo, ibi: cum igitur reminiscimur etc. Second he points out the manner in which one proceeds in recollecting where he says hence, when we recollect (451b16). Causa autem reminiscendi est ordo motuum qui relinquuntur in anima ex prima impressione eius quod primo apprehendimus; hanc ergo causam proponens dicit quod reminiscentiae contingunt per hoc quod unus motus natus est post alium nobis occurrere, quod quidem contingit dupliciter: The cause of recollecting is the order of the motions that remain in the soul from the first impression of what we first apprehend. Accordingly, in setting out this cause, he states that recollections happen because one motion is naturally disposed to occur to us after another. This may happen in two ways. uno modo quando secundus motus consequitur post primum ex necessitate, sicut ad apprehensionem hominis sequitur apprehensio animalis ex necessitate, et sic manifestum est quod, quando anima movetur primo motu, movebitur etiam secundo; In one way, when the second motion follows the first of necessity, as apprehending “animal” of necessity follows on apprehending “man”; and thus it is manifest that, when the soul is moved by the first movement, it will be moved by the second, too. alio vero modo contingit quod secundus motus sequitur post primum non ex necessitate sed ex consuetudine, quia scilicet aliquis consuevit post hoc illud cogitare vel dicere vel facere, et tunc secundus motus sequitur post primum non semper, sed ut ad multum, id est ut in pluribus, sicut etiam effectus naturales ut in pluribus ex suis causis consequuntur, non semper. Dicta autem consuetudo non firmatur aequaliter in omnibus hominibus, sed accidit quod quidam semel cogitando velocius firment in se consuetudinem quam alii si multotiens cogitent hoc post illud (quod potest contingere vel propter maiorem attentionem et profundiorem cogitationem vel propter naturam quae est melius receptiva et retentiva impressionis). Et inde etiam contingit quod nos semel videntes quaedam magis memoramur eorum quam alia multotiens visa (quia ea quibus vehementius intendimus magis in memoria manent, ea vero quae superficialiter et leviter videmus aut cogitamus cito a memoria labuntur). In the other way, the second motion may follow after the first not of necessity but from custom, since one is accustomed to think, say, or do that thing after this one, and then the second motion follows after the first not always but as it were much, i.e. for the most part, as natural effects also follow from their causes for the most part, not always. The custom under discussion is not, however, established equally in all men, but it comes about that some more quickly establish the custom within themselves on thinking once, than do others if they think this after that several times (which can happen either because of greater attention and deeper cogitation or because of a nature that is better able to receive and retain an impression). Hence, too, it may come about that we remember some things more seeing them once than others seen many times (since those things that we are more vehemently intent upon remain more in the memory, whereas those that we see or think of superficially or lightly slip quickly from the memory). Deinde cum dicit: cum ergo reminiscimur etc., ostendit quomodo reminiscentia procedat, supposito praedicto ordine motuum. Et circa hoc duo facit: Then, on the supposition of this order of motions, he shows how recollection proceeds, where he says hence, when we recollect (451b16). Concerning this point he does two things. primo manifestat modum procedendi in reminiscendo; In the first place he shows the manner of proceeding in recollecting. secundo ostendit unde oporteat reminiscentem procedere, ibi: oportet autem acceptum esse principium etc. In the second place he points out whence a recollector ought to proceed, where he says a beginning-point, however (Ch. 6, 452a12). Circa primum duo facit: With regard to the first topic he does two things. primo manifestat modum quo proceditur in reminiscendo; In the first place he shows the manner in which one proceeds in recollecting. secundo ex hoc ostendit qualiter differt reminisci et iterum addiscere, quod supra indeterminatum dimiserat, et hoc ibi: et in hoc reminisci etc. In the second place, from this he points out how recollecting and relearning differ, which is a matter he had left unsettled above; he does this where he says recollecting also differs from relearning (Ch. 6, 452a4). Circa primum tria facit: With regard to the first topic he does three things. primo proponit modum reminiscendi; In the first place he sets out how recollecting occurs. secundo ex hoc solvit quamdam dubitationem, ibi: nihil autem oportet etc.; In the second place on the basis of this he resolves a difficulty, where he says it is not at all necessary to attend (451b25). tertio manifestat propositum per signa, ibi: unde citissime etc. In the third place he uses examples to clarify what he had set out to show, where he says hence recollections come about (451b31). Primo ergo concludit ex praemissis quod, ex quo unus motus sequitur post alterum vel ex necessitate vel ex consuetudine, oportet quod, quando reminiscimur, moveamur secundum aliquem priorum motuum, quousque veniamus ad hoc quod moveamur apprehendendo illo motu qui consuevit esse post primum, quem scilicet motum intendimus reinvenire reminiscendo, quia reminiscentia nihil est aliud quam inquisitio alicuius quod a memoria excidit. Et ideo reminiscendo venamur, id est inquirimus, id quod consequenter est ab aliquo priori quod in memoria tenemus (sicut enim ille qui inquirit per demonstrationem procedit ex aliquo priori quod est notum ex quo venatur aliquid posterius quod est ignotum, ita etiam reminiscens ex aliquo priori quod in memoria habetur procedit ad reinveniendum id quod ex memoria excidit); Accordingly, in the first place, he concludes from the premises (451b10–16) that, since one motion follows after another either of necessity or by custom, it must be that, when we recollect, we are moved according to some one of the prior movements, until we come to the point that we are moved by the movement to be apprehended, which is accustomed to be after the first, namely, the movement that we intend to rediscover by recollecting, since recollection is nothing other than a search for something that has fallen from memory. Hence in recollecting we hunt, i.e. we search, for what is consequently from something prior that we do remember (for just as he who searches through demonstration proceeds from something prior, which is known, from which he is made to come to something posterior, which was unknown; so too the one who recollects proceeds from something prior, which he remembers, to rediscover what had fallen from his memory). hoc autem primum, a quo reminiscens suam inquisitionem incipit, quandoque quidem est tempus aliquod notum, quandoque autem aliqua res nota; secundum tempus quidem incipit quandoque a nunc, id est a praesenti tempore procedendo in praeteritum cuius quaerit memoriam (puta si quaerit memorari id quod fecit ante quatuor dies, meditatur sic: hodie feci hoc, heri illud, tertia die aliud, et sic secundum consequentiam motuum consuetorum pervenit resolvendo in id quod fecit quarta die); quandoque vero incipit ab aliquo alio tempore (puta si quis in memoria habeat quid fecerit octavo die ante et oblitus sit quid fecerit quarta die, procedet descendendo ad septimam et sic inde quousque veniat ad quartam vel etiam ab octava die ascendet in .XV. aut in aliquod aliud tempus praeteritum); The “first” from which a recollector begins his search, however, is sometimes a time that is known and sometimes a thing that is known. With respect to the time, he sometimes begins from now, i.e. from the present time proceeding into the past, the memory of which he is seeking (e.g. if he is seeking to remember what he did four days ago, this is how he meditates on the matter: “I did this today, that yesterday, and something else the day before,” and in this fashion he arrives at what he did three days ago by tracing things back according to the sequence of the customary motions). Sometimes, however, he begins from some other time (e.g. if someone remembers what he did a week ago and has forgotten what he did three days ago, he will proceed by coming down to the sixth day and will proceed in the same way until he reaches the third day before, or he may also go up to a day two weeks ago also starting from a week ago, or to any other past time). similiter etiam quandoque reminiscitur aliquis incipiens ab aliqua re cuius memoratur a qua procedit ad aliam, triplici ratione: quandoque quidem ratione similitudinis (sicut quando aliquis memoratur de Socrate et per hoc occurrit ei Plato qui est similis in sapientia), quandoque vero ratione contrarietatis (sicut si aliquis memoretur Hectoris et per hoc occurrit ei Achilles), quandoque vero ratione propinquitatis cuiuscumque (sicut cum aliquis memor est patris et per hoc occurrit ei filius, et eadem ratio est de quacumque alia propinquitate vel societatis vel loci vel temporis). Sometimes, in like fashion, one may also recollect beginning with something that he remembers and from which he proceeds to another one for three reasons: (1) sometimes one recollects by reason of similitude (e.g. when one remembers Socrates, and from this Plato, who is like him in wisdom, comes to mind); (2) sometimes, by reason of contrariety (as when one remembers Hector, and Achilles therefore comes to mind); (3) and sometimes one recollects by reason of some proximity (as when the son comes to mind when one remembers the father, and the same reason holds for any other sort of proximity, whether of association, of place, or of time). Et propter hoc fit reminiscentia, quia motus horum se invicem consequuntur: And recollection comes about because the motions corresponding to these cases follow them. quorumdam enim praemissorum motus sunt idem, sicut praecipue similium, quorumdam autem simul, scilicet contrariorum, quia cognito uno contrariorum simul cognoscitur aliud; quandoque vero quidam motus habent partem aliorum, sicut contingit in quibuscumque propinquis, quia in uno propinquorum consideratur aliquid quod pertinet ad alterum; et ideo illud residuum quod deest apprehensioni, cum sit parvum, consequitur motum prioris, ut apprehenso primo, consequenter occurrat apprehensioni secundum. For the motions of some of the aforementioned items are the same, as is especially so of the similars; of others, viz. the contraries, however, at the same time, since when one of the contraries is known, the other is known at the same time; and sometimes certain motions have a part of others, as happens in things that are in proximity to each other, since something is considered in one of the neighbors which pertains to the other; and so, although the residue that is missing from one’s apprehension be small, it follows the motion of the prior one, so that, once the first has been apprehended, the second consequently comes to mind. Est autem considerandum ulterius quod quandoque pervenitur ad motum posteriorem ex aliquo priori secundum praedictum modum ab his qui quaerunt reinvenire motum consequentem perditum, et hoc proprie est reminisci, quando scilicet aliquis ex intentione inquirit alicuius rei memoriam; contingit autem quandoque quod etiam illi qui non quaerunt memorari, praeter <intentionem> sic procedentes ex priori motu in posteriorem ut dictum est, deveniunt in memoriam alicuius rei, cum ille motus rei oblitae fiat in anima post alium, et hoc quidem erat praeter intentionem, sed ut secundum multa, id est ut in pluribus, factis aliis motibus quales diximus, scilicet similibus vel contrariis vel propinquis, insurgebat ille motus qui occurrit; sed hoc abusive dicitur reminisci, est autem casualiter memorari secundum similitudinem quamdam reminiscentiae. There is, however, a further point to consider: sometimes those who seek to rediscover a consequent lost motion arrive at a later motion from a prior one in the manner described: this is properly recollecting just when one intentionally seeks for the memory of a thing. Sometimes, however, it happens that even those who do not seek to remember come upon the memory of a thing when they proceed unintentionally from the prior to the posterior movement in the manner described (451b16–18): when that movement of the forgotten thing comes into being in the soul after the other and this was unintentional but as it were much, i.e. as that motion which occurs arises in many other motions such as we have spoken of, viz. the like, the contrary, or the proximate; but the latter unintentional movement is called recollecting by way of a departure from proper usage; it is rather a chance remembering with a certain resemblance to recollection. Deinde cum dicit: nihil autem oportet intendere etc., solvit ex praemissis quamdam dubitationem. Posset enim alicui venire in dubium quare frequenter memoramur ea quae procul sunt, puta ea quae ante multos annos contigerunt, et non memoramur ea quae sunt prope, puta quae fuerunt ante paucos dies; Then, when he says it is not at all necessary to attend (451b25), he solves a certain difficulty on the basis of these premises (451b16–25). For one could come to wonder why we frequently remember the things that are distant, i.e. those that happened many years ago, and we do not remember the ones that are near, i.e. those that were a few days ago.