Capitulum 6 Chapter 6 Recollection's beginning and its difference from relearning Et in hoc reminisci differt ab iterum addiscere, quia poterit quodam modo moveri in id quod est post principium. Cum vero non, sed per aliud, non adhuc memoratur. Recollecting also differs from relearning in this: that one will be able somehow to be moved to what is after the starting point; but when not, but through something else, one no longer remembers. Multotiens autem iam quidem non potest reminisci, quaerens autem potest et invenit. Hoc autem fit multa moventi, si moveat huiusmodi motu quem consequatur res. Meminere enim est inesse potentiam moventem; hoc autem est ut et ex ipso et quibus habetur motibus moveatur, sicut dictum est. Often, however, one cannot any longer recollect but can seek and does find. This, however, comes about for one who is moving many things, if he should be moving with the sort of motion as that upon which the thing follows. For remembering is to be a moving potency within; and this is so in such a way that one is being moved from himself and the motions by which he is held, as has been said. Oportet autem acceptum esse principium. A beginning-point, however, must have been taken. Propter quod a locis videntur reminisci aliquando. For which reason they sometimes seem to recollect from places. Causa autem est quia velociter ab alio in aliud veniunt, ut a lacte in album, ab albo autem in aerem et ab hoc in humidum, a quo meminit autumpni, hanc quaerens horam. The cause of this is that they come quickly from one thing to another, as from milk to white, from white to air, and from the latter to the moist—from which one remembers autumn while seeking this season. Videtur autem universale principium et medium omnium. Si enim non prius, cum in hoc veniat reminiscetur, aut non iam neque aliunde. Ut si quis intellexerit in quibus A B G D E Z I T: si enim non in E reminiscitur, in T meminit; hinc enim ad ambo motum esse contingit, et ad D et ad E. Si vero non horum aliquod quaerit, in G veniens reminiscetur, si I aut Z inquirit. Si autem non, in A. Et sic semper. A universal, moreover, seems to be the beginning-point and the middle of them all. For if one does not do so before, when he gets to this point, he will recollect, or he will not do so from anywhere else, either. Thus, if someone should have understood something in which there are A B G D E Z I T: for if one does not recollect at E, he remembers at T; for from there one can be moved to both—both to D and to E. But if one is not seeking one of these, one will recollect on coming to G, if one is looking for I or Z; and if not, he will go on to A, and so on always. Eius autem quod ab eodem aliquando quidem meminere, aliquando autem non, causa est quia contingit ad plus motum esse ab eodem principio, ut ab ipso G in E aut in D. Si igitur non per antiquum movetur, inconsuetius movetur: tanquam enim natura iam consuetudo est. Unde quae multotiens intelleximus, cito reminiscimur. Sicut enim natura hoc post hoc est, sic et operatio hoc multociens naturam facit. The cause of one’s sometimes remembering from the same and sometimes not remembering is that one happens to have been moved from the same starting-point to many places, as, for example, from G to E or to D. Hence, if one is not being moved through the old one, he is being moved in a more uncustomary way: for custom already serves as nature. Hence we quickly recollect things that we have frequently understood. For, just as this thing is by nature after this one, so too does action make a nature by doing this many times. Quoniam autem sicut in hiis quae sunt natura, fit et extra naturam et a fortuna, adhuc magis in hiis quae per consuetudinem sunt, quibus natura non similiter inest; quare moveri aliquando et ibi et aliter aliterque, et cum retrahatur inde ipse casu quoquam; et propter hoc cum indigeat nomen reminisci, dissimile quo scimus in illud soloecizamus. But since just as in things that exist by nature there comes to be what is both outside nature and also by chance, still more is this the case in those that exist by custom, in the latter of which nature does not exist in the same way whereby sometimes to be moved both there and in one way and in another, and when he is drawn hence in any case; and for this reason when one needs to recollect a name we commit a solecism dissimilar to the one we know against it. Reminisci quidem igitur hoc accidit modo. It is in this way, therefore, that recollecting occurs. Et in hoc reminisci differt etc. Postquam Philosophus ostendit modum reminiscendi, hic manifestat duo quae supra tacta sunt: Recollecting also differs (452a4). After the Philosopher shows how recollecting takes place, here he explains two points that were touched upon above. primo quidem quomodo differant reminisci et iterum addiscere; In the first place, he shows how recollecting differs from relearning. secundo quod oportet reminiscentem a principiis incipere, ibi: oportet autem acceptum esse etc. Second he shows that one who recollects must begin from starting-points, where he says a beginning-point (452a12). Circa primum duo facit: With respect to the first topic he does two things. primo ostendit quomodo differt reminisci et iterum addiscere; First he shows how recollecting differs from relearning. secundo quomodo differt reminisci et iterum invenire, ibi: multotiens autem etc. Second he shows how recollecting differs from rediscovering, where he says often, however, one cannot any longer recollect (452a7). Circa primum considerandum est quod tam ille qui reminiscitur quam ille qui iterato addiscit recuperat notitiam quam amisit; sed ille qui reminiscitur recuperat eam sub ratione memoriae, in ordine scilicet ad id quod fuit prius cognitum, ille autem qui iterato addiscit recuperat eam absolute, non quasi alicuius prius cogniti. Cum autem ad notitiam ignotorum non perveniamus nisi ex aliquibus principiis praecognitis, necesse est quod principia ex quibus procedimus ad aliquid ignotum cognoscendum sint eiusdem generis ut patet in I Posteriorum. Et ideo necesse est quod reminiscens ad recuperandum notitiam sub ratione memoriae procedat ex aliquibus principiis memoratis, quod non contingit iterato addiscenti. With respect to the first point, we must bear in mind that both he who recollects and also he who relearns recover a notion that they lost; but the one who recollects recovers it under the aspect of memory, i.e. in a relation ordered to something that had been known before, whereas the one who relearns it, recovers the notion absolutely, i.e. not as pertaining to something previously known. Now since we do not arrive at a notion of things unknown except from previously known principles, the principles from which we proceed to know anything unknown must belong to the same genus, as is clear from the Posterior Analytics. Hence he who is recollecting necessarily proceeds to recover the notion under the aspect of memory from starting-points that have been remembered, but this is not the case with one who is relearning something. Dicit ergo quod in hoc differt reminisci ab hoc quod est iterum addiscere, quia reminiscens habet potestatem quodam modo ut moveatur in aliquid quod consequitur ad principium in memoria retentum (puta cum aliquis recordatur quod tale quid dictum est ei, oblitus est autem quis ei dixerit: utetur ergo ad reminiscendum id cuius est oblitus eo quod habet in memoria). Sed quando non pervenit ad recuperandum amissam notitiam per principium in memoria retentum, sed per aliquid aliud quod ei de novo traditur a docente, non est memoria nec reminiscentia, sed hoc est de novo addiscere. Accordingly he says that recollecting differs from relearning in this: that he who is recollecting has the power somehow to be moved to something that is consequent upon a starting-point that has been retained in the memory (for instance, when someone remembers that such and such a thing was said to him but has forgotten who had told him, one therefore uses what he has in the memory to recollect what he has forgotten). But when one does not arrive at the recovery of a lost notion through a starting-point that has been retained in the memory but through something else that is newly handed on to him by a teacher, that is not memory or recollection but new learning. Deinde cum dicit: multoties autem etc., manifestat quomodo differat reminisci et iterum invenire. Et dicit quod multoties homo non potest iam reminisci eius quod oblitus est, quia non manent in eo motus aliqui ex quibus possit devenire in id quod quaerit memorari, sed si quaerat quasi de novo notitiam illius rei, potest procedere et multotiens invenit id quod quaerit, ac si de novo scientiam acquireret. Istud autem contingit quando anima diversa excogitans multis motibus movetur; et si contingat quod perveniat ad motum [ad quem consequitur] unde cognitio rei, tunc dicitur invenire. Ideo autem non potest reminisci, licet posset invenire, quia reminisci contingit per hoc quod homo interius retinet quamdam potentiam vel virtutem inducendi se ad motus rei quos quaerit; hoc autem contingit cum potest pervenire ad hoc quod moveatur motu quem amisit per oblivionem, et hoc ex se ipso, non ex aliquo docente ut contingit quando iterum addiscit, et ex motibus praehabitis, sicut dictum est, non ex novis motibus sicut quando iterum invenit. Then, when he says often, however, one cannot any longer recollect (452a7), he explains how recollecting and rediscovery differ from each other. He says that a human being often cannot any longer recollect what he has forgotten, because the particular movements from which he could arrive at what he is seeking to remember do not remain in him, but, if he should seek the notion of that thing in a new way, he can proceed and often does find what he is seeking as though he were acquiring the science anew. Now that happens when a soul, while thinking out diverse things, is moved by many movements: if, in addition, it should happen that it arrive at a movement at which a cognition of the thing follows, then one is said to be discovering it. Though one can be discovering something, one cannot, however, be recollecting it, since recollecting comes about because a human being retains within himself a certain potency or power of guiding himself toward the movements that he is seeking of the thing. This recollecting, however, comes about when one can arrive at what is being moved with the movement that he lost through forgetfulness, doing so both from himself, not from someone teaching him, as happens when one relearns something, and from previously held movements, as has been said (452a5–6), not from new movements, as when one rediscovers something. Deinde cum dicit: oportet autem acceptum esse etc., manifestat quod oportet reminiscentem a principio incipere. Et circa hoc duo facit: Then, when he says a beginning-point, however, must have been taken (452a12), he shows that one who is recollecting must start from a beginning. Concerning this topic he does two things. primo ostendit propositum; First he points out the claim under discussion. secundo assignat causam defectus quem quandoque patimur in reminiscendo, ibi: eius autem quod ab eodem etc. Second he assigns the cause for a defect that we sometimes suffer in recollecting where he says the cause of one’s sometimes remembering (452a24). Circa primum duo facit: With respect to the first point he does two things. primo ostendit quod oportet reminiscentem incipere a principio; In the first place he shows that one who is recollecting must start from a beginning-point. secundo ostendit a quali principio, ibi: videtur autem universale etc. In the second place he indicates what sort of starting-point he must begin from, where he says a universal, moreover, seems to be the beginning-point (452a17). Circa primum tria facit. Concerning the first topic he does three things. Primo proponit quod intendit. Et dicit, quod oportet eum qui vult reminisci accipere principium a quo incipit moveri vel cogitando vel loquendo vel aliud faciendo. In the first place he sets out what he intends to claim. He says that he who wants to recollect must take a beginning-point from which he has begun to be moved either by thinking, by saying, or by doing something. Secundo ibi: propter quod etc., manifestat quod dixit per signum. Quia enim oportet reminiscentem aliquod principium accipere unde incipiat procedere ad reminiscendum, inde est quod aliquando homines videntur reminisci a locis, in quibus aliqua sunt dicta vel facta vel cogitata, utentes loco quasi quodam principio ad reminiscendum, quia accessus ad locum est principium quoddam omnium eorum quae in loco aguntur. Unde et Tullius in sua Rhetorica docet ad facile memorandum imaginari quaedam loca ordinata, quibus phantasmata eorum quae memorari volumus quodam ordine distribuamus. In the second place, he illustrates what he had said by using an example where he says for which reason they sometimes seem to recollect (452a12). For since he who is recollecting must take hold of a starting-point from which he may start proceeding to recollect, human beings sometimes seem to recollect from the places in which certain things have been said, done, or thought. They do so using a place as a sort of starting-point for recollecting, because the entrance to a place is a sort of starting-point of all the things that are done in that place. This is also why Tully in his Rhetoric teaches that, to remember easily, certain places are imagined to be arrayed in order, and by means of these places we distribute the images of the things we want to remember. Tertio ibi: causa autem est etc., manifestat propositum per causam, dicens quod causa quare oportet reminiscentem accipere principium est quia homines de facili per mentis quamdam evagationem de uno veniunt in aliud, ratione similitudinis aut contrarietatis aut propinquitatis, sicut si cogitemus vel loquamur de lacte, de facili pervenimus in album, propter lactis albedinem, et de albo in aerem, propter claritatem diaphani quae causat albedinem, ab aere autem in humidum, quia aer est humidus, ab humido autem pervenit ad reminiscendum temporis autumnalis quod quaerebat, ratione contrarietatis, quia hoc tempus est frigidum et siccum. In the third place he illustrates his claim through its cause where he says the cause of this is that they come quickly (452a13). He says that the cause whereby he who is recollecting must get hold of a starting point is that human beings, through a kind of wandering of the mind, come easily from one thing to another by reason of its likeness, its contrariety, or its proximity. Thus, if we think or speak about milk we come easily to white, because of the whiteness of milk, and from white to air because of the clarity of the transparent, which causes whiteness, and from air to the moist because air is moist, and from the moist one comes to recollect the season of autumn, which one was seeking, by reason of contrariety, since that season is cold and dry. Deinde cum dicit: videtur autem etc., ostendit quale principium reminiscens debeat accipere. Et dicit quod id quod est universale videtur esse principium et medium per quod potest perveniri ad omnia (dicitur autem hic universale non id quod praedicatur de pluribus, sicut in logicis, sed id a quo aliquis consuevit ad diversa moveri, sicut si post lac aliquis moveatur ad albedinem et ad dulcedinem et iterum ab albedine ad quaedam alia, sicut dictum est, et iterum a dulcedine ad calorem digerentem et ad ignem et ad alia consequenter cogitata, lac erit quasi universale ad omnes istos motus). Et oportet ad hoc recurrere si quis voluerit cuiuscumque consequentium reminisci, quia, si non reminiscitur alicuius consequentium prius per alia posteriora principia, saltem reminisci cum venerit ad primum universale principium, aut, si tunc non reminiscitur, non poterit aliunde reminisci. Then, when he says a universal, moreover, seems to be the starting-point (452a17), he indicates what sort of starting-point one who is recollecting ought to get hold of. He says that what is universal seems to be the beginning-point and the middle, through which one can be brought to all things (but here the universal that is spoken of is not that which is predicated of many, as in logic, but rather that by which one is accustomed to be moved to various things; it is as if after milk one is being moved to whiteness and sweetness, and again from whiteness to other things, as has been said (452a13–17), and again from sweetness to the digesting heat, to fire, and to other things thought of in due sequence, milk will be, so to speak, the universal with respect to all these motions). In addition, one must run back to this universal if one wants to recollect any of the consequent items; since if one does not recollect any of the consequent terms previously through other posterior beginning-points, one will at least recollect it when he has come to the first universal beginning-point; or, if one does not recollect it then, one will not be able to do so from any other. Et ponit exemplum de diversis cogitatis per diversas literas, A B G D E Z I T (quas quidem literas enumerat secundum ordinem Graeci alphabeti; non tamen reminiscendo est idem ordo, sed accipiendum est quod aliquis cogitando vel loquendo de B veniat in A, de A vero quandoque quidem in T, quandoque vero in G, de T autem quandoque in D, quandoque in E, de G vero quandoque in I, quandoque in Z). In addition he gives an example about various thoughts by the various letters A B G D E Z I T (he reckons these letters according to the order of the Greek alphabet; yet the order is not the same in the recollecting, but we must take it that in thinking or speaking about B one may come to A; in thinking about A, however, sometimes one comes to T, sometimes to G; now from T one sometimes comes to D and sometimes to E; in thinking about G, on the other hand, sometimes one comes to I and sometimes to Z). Si ergo aliquis non reminiscatur eius quod est in E, poterit reminisci si veniat ad T, ex quo movebatur ad duo, scilicet ad E et ad D. Sed forte non quaerebat E neque D, sed quaerebat I vel Z, et tunc veniens ad G reminiscetur. Sed quia nescimus utrum illud quod quaerimus contineatur sub T vel sub G, oportet recurrere ad A, quod est quasi universale respectu omnium. Et sic semper oportet procedere, puta si adhuc B sit universalius quam A. If, therefore, one should not recollect what is in E, he will be able to recollect it if he should come to T, from which he used to be moved to the two, viz. to E and to D. But perhaps one was not seeking E and not D, either, but rather was seeking I or Z, then coming to G one will recollect. But since we do not know whether what we are seeking is contained under T or under G, one must run back to A, which is, as it were, the universal with respect to them all. And one must so proceed always; for instance if at that point B is still more universal than A. Potest autem et aliter dispositio praedicta intelligi, ut ab A directe quidem veniatur in G, lateraliter autem in B (quamvis de B in littera mentio non fiat), a G autem lateraliter quidem in I et Z hinc et inde, directe autem in T, a quo in D et E. Et ideo dicit quod, si aliquis <non> meminit in E, quod est ultimum, venit in T, quod est prius; et si forte in T non meminit, quia id quod quaerit non continetur sub eo, recurrendum est ad G, sub quo quaedam alia continentur, puta I et Z, et deinde in A, ut prius dictum est, sub quo continetur etiam B. The aforesaid arrangement can, however, also be understood in another way, so that one is made to come from A to G directly, but to B laterally (although there is no mention of B in the text); moreover, one may be led from G laterally to I on the one hand and to Z on the other, but directly to T, from which one is led to D and E. And so he says that if one does not remember in E, which is last, he comes into T, which is prior; and if perchance one does not remember in T, because what he is seeking is not contained under it, he must run back to G, under which certain other thoughts are contained, namely I and Z, and from there to A, under which, as has been said before (452a23), B is also contained. Deinde cum dicit: eius autem quod ab eodem etc., assignat causam defectus quem reminiscentes patiuntur. Then, when he says the cause of one’s sometimes remembering (452a24), he assigns the cause for a deficiency that is experienced by those who recollect. Et primo quantum ad hoc quod omnino non reminiscimur; He explains this defect in their recollection first to the extent that they do not recollect at all;