1. first, he shows the divinity of Christ

1. first, he treats of the divinity of the Word (per 108) [ or the divinity of Christ (per 23) ]

1. (because there are two items to be considered in each thing, namely its existence and its operation or power) first, he treats of the existence of the Word as to his divine nature

1. clauses 1 and 2: pertaining to the inquiry “whether something exists”

1. first clause: he shows when the Word was, and here three things present themselves for careful study according to the three parts of this statement, at In the beginning was the Word

1. first, it is necessary to investigate the name Word

1. first, to understand the name Word we should note that according to the Philosopher, vocal sounds are signs of the affections that exist in our soul; it is customary in Scripture for the things signified to be themselves called by the names of their signs, as in the statement, and the rock was Christ (1 Cor 10:4)

1. the meaning of the name “word”

1. first, it is fitting that what is within our soul and which is signified by our external word, be called a word

2. second, but whether the name ‘word’ belongs first to the exterior vocal sound or to the conception in our mind, is not our concern at present

1. first, however, it is obvious that what is signified by the vocal sound, as existing interiorly in the soul, exists prior to the vocal expression inasmuch as it is its actual cause.

2. second, therefore if we wish to grasp the meaning of the interior word, we must first look at the meaning of that which is exteriorly expressed in words

1. first, now there are three things in our intellect

1. first, the intellectual power itself

2. second, the species of the thing understood, which is its form, and this form being to the intellect what the species of a color is to the eye

3. third, the very activity of the intellect, which is to understand

2. second, but none of these is what is signified by the exterior vocal word

1. first, for the name “stone” does not signify the substance of the intellect because this is not what the one naming intends

2. second, nor does it signify the species, which is that by which the intellect understands, since this also is not the intention of the one naming

3. third, nor does it signify the act itself of understanding since to understand is not an action proceeding to the exterior from the one understanding, but an action remaining within

3. third, therefore, that is properly called an interior word which the one understanding forms when understanding

1. first, now the intellect forms two things, according to its two operations

1. first, according to its operation which is called “the understanding of indivisibles,” it forms a definition

2. second, while according to its operation by which it unites and separates, it forms an enunciation or something of that sort

2. second, hence, what is thus formed and expressed by the operation of the intellect, whether by defining or enunciating, is what the exterior vocal sound signifies

1. first, so the Philosopher says that the notion (ratio) which a name signifies is a definition

2. second, hence, what is thus expressed, i.e., formed in the soul, is called an interior word

1. first, consequently it is compared to the intellect, not as that by which the intellect understands

2. second, but as that in which it understands

1. first, because it is in what is thus expressed and formed that it sees the nature of the thing understood

2. second, thus we have the meaning of the name “word”

2. secondly, from what has been said we are able to understand that a word is always something that proceeds from an intellect existing in act

1. first, and furthermore, that a word is always a notion and likeness of the thing understood

1. first, so if the one understanding and the thing understood are the same, then the word is a notion and likeness of the intellect from which it proceeds

2. second, on the other hand, if the one understanding is other than the thing understood

1. first, then the word is not a likeness and notion of the one understanding, but of the thing understood

2. second, as the conception which one has of a stone is a likeness of only the stone

3. third, but when the intellect understands itself

1. first, its word is a likeness and notion of the intellect

2. second, and so Augustine (On the Trinity IX, 5) sees a likeness of the Trinity in the soul

1. first, insofar as the mind understands itself

2. second, but not insofar as it understands other things

2. second, it is clear then, that it is necessary to have a word in any intellectual nature

1. first, for it is of the very nature of understanding that the intellect in understanding should form something

2. second, now what is formed is called a word

3. third, and so it follows that in every being which understands, there must be a word

3. third, however, intellectual natures are of three kinds: human, angelic and divine; and so there are three kinds of words

1. first, so there are three kinds of words

1. first, the human word, about which it is said in the Psalm (13:1): the fool said in his heart, there is no God

2. second, the angelic word, about which it is said in Zechariah (1:9), and in many places in Sacred Scripture, and the angel said to me

3. third, the divine word, of which Genesis (1:3) says, and God said, Let there be light

2. second, so when the Evangelist says, in the beginning was the Word, we cannot understand this as a human or angelic word

1. because both these words have been made since man and angel have a cause and principle of their existence and operation

2. and the word of a man or an angel cannot exist before they do

3. third, the word the Evangelist had in mind he shows by saying that this word was not made

1. first, since all things were made by it

2. second, therefore, the word about which John speaks here is the Word of God.

3. third, we should note that this Word differs from our own word in three ways

1. first, according to Augustine, that our word is formable before being formed

1. first, for when I wish to conceive the notion of a stone, I must arrive at it by reasoning

1. first, and so it is in all other things that are understood by us

2. second, with the sole possible exception of the first principles, which, since they are known in a simple manner, are known at once without any discourse of reason

3. third, so as long as the intellect, in so reasoning, casts about this way and that, the formation is not yet complete

2. second, it is only when it has conceived the notion of the thing perfectly that for the first time it has the notion of the complete thing and a word

1. first, thus in our mind there is both a cogitation, meaning the discourse involved in an investigation

2. second, and a word, which is formed according to a perfect contemplation of the truth

3. third, so our word is first in potency before it is in act

3. third, but the Word of God is always in act

1. first, in consequence, the term cogitation does not properly speaking apply to the Word of God

2. second, for Augustine says (On the Trinity XV): the Word of God is spoken of in such a way that cogitation is not included, lest anything changeable be supposed in God

3. third, Anselm was speaking improperly when he said: for the supreme Spirit to speak is for him to look at something while cogitating

2. second, that our word is imperfect, but the divine Word is most perfect

1. first, for since we cannot express all our conceptions in one word, we must form many imperfect words through which we separately express all that is in our

2. second, but it is not that way with God

1. first, for since he understands both himself and everything else through his essence, by one act, the single divine Word is expressive of all that is in God, not only of the persons but also of creatures; otherwise it would be imperfect

2. second, so Augustine says: if there were less in the Word than is contained in the knowledge of the one speaking it, the Word would be imperfect; but it is obvious that it is most perfect; therefore, it is only one. God speaks once (Job 33:14)

3. third, that our word is not of the same nature as we; but divine Word is of the same nature as God, and therefore it is something that subsists in the divine nature

1. first, for the understood notion which the intellect is seen to form about some thing has only an intelligible existence in our soul

1. first, now in our soul, to understand is not the same as the nature of the soul, because our soul is not its own operation

2. second, consequently, the word which our intellect forms is not of the essence of our soul, but is an accident of it

2. second, but in God, to understand and to be are the same

1. first, and so the Word of the divine intellect is not an accident but belongs to its nature, thus it must be subsistent

2. second, because whatever is in the nature of God is God

3. third, thus Damascene says that God is a substantial word, and a hypostasis, but our words are concepts in our mind

3. third, from the above it is clear that the Word, properly speaking, is always understood as a person in the divinity, since it implies only something expressed, by the one understanding

1. first, also, that in the divinity the Word is the likeness of that from which it issues

2. second, and that it is co-eternal with that from which it issues, since it was not first formable before being formed, but was always in act

3. third, and that it is equal to the Father, since it is perfect and expressive of the whole being of the Father

4. fourth, and that it is co-essential and consubstantial with the Father, since it is his substance

5. fifth, it is also clear that since in every nature that which issues forth and has a likeness to the nature from which it issues is called a son

1. first, and since this Word issues forth in a likeness and identity to the nature from which it issues

2. second, it is suitably and appropriately called a son, and its production is called a generation

6. sixth, so now the first point is clear, the meaning of the term Word

2. second, there are four questions on this point

1. first, from Chrysostom: why did John the Evangelist omit the Father and begin at once with the Son, saying, in the beginning was the Word?

1. first, there are two answers to this; one is that the Father was known to everyone in the Old Testament, although not under the aspect of Father, but as God

1. first, but the Son was not known

2. second, and so in the New Testament, which is concerned with our knowledge of the Word, he begins with the Word or Son.

2. second, the other answer is that we are brought to know the Father though the Son

1. first, Father, I have manifested your name to the men whom you have given to me (below 17:6)

2. second, and so wishing to lead the faithful to a knowledge of the Father, the Evangelist fittingly began with the Son, at once adding something about the Father when he says, and the Word was with God

2. second, from Chrysostom: why did he say Word and not Son, since as we have said, the Word proceeds as Son?

1. first, there are also two answers to this; first, because son means something begotten, and when we hear of the generation of the Son, someone might suppose that this generation is the kind he can comprehend, that is, a material and changeable generation

1. first, thus he did not say “Son,” but Word, which signifies an intelligible proceeding, so that it would not be understood as a material and changeable generation

2. second, and so in showing that the Son is born of the Father in an unchangeable way, he eliminates a faulty conjecture by using the name Word.

2. second, the Evangelist was about to consider the Word as having come to manifest the Father; but since the idea of manifesting is implied better in the name “Word” than in the name “Son,” he preferred to use the name Word.

3. third, from Augustine, in Greek, where we have Word, they have Logos; now since Logos signifies in Latin both the notion and word [i.e., ratio et verbum], why did the translators render it as word and not notion since a notion is something interior just as a word is?

1. first, I answer that “notion” [ratio], properly speaking, names a conception of the mind precisely as in the mind, even if through it nothing exterior comes to be

2. second, but “word” signifies a reference to something exterior

3. third, and so because the Evangelist, when he said Logos intended to signify not only a reference to the Son’s existence in the Father, but also the operative power of the Son, by which, through him, all things were made, our predecessors preferred to translate it Word, which implies a reference to something exterior, rather than “notion,” which implies merely a concept of the mind.

4. fourth, from Origen: in many passages, Scripture, when speaking of the Word of God, does not simply call him the Word, but adds “of God,” saying, “the Word of God,” or “of the Lord”: the Word of God on high is the foundation of wisdom (Sir 1:5); his name is the Word of God; why then did the Evangelist, when speaking here of the Word of God, not say, “In the beginning was the Word of God,” but said In the beginning was the Word?

1. first, I answer that although there are many participated truths

1. first, there is just one absolute Truth, which is Truth by its very essence, that is, the divine act of being (esse); and by this Truth all words are words

2. second, similarly, there is one absolute Wisdom elevated above all things, that is, the divine Wisdom, by participating in which all wise persons are wise

3. third, further, there is one absolute Word, by participating in which all persons having a word are called speakers

4. fourth, now this is the divine Word which of itself is the Word elevated above all words; so in order that the Evangelist might signify this supereminence of the divine Word, he pointed out this Word to us absolutely without any addition

2. second, and because the Greeks, when they wished to signify something separate and elevated above everything else did this by affixing the article to the name

1. first, just as the Platonists, wishing to signify the separated substances, such as the separated good or the separated man, called them the good per se, or man per se

2. second, so the Evangelist, wishing to signify the separation and elevation of the Word above all things, affixed an article to the name “Logos,” so that if it were stated in Latin we would have “the Word.”

2. secondly, the phrase in the beginning

1. since the word principium (beginning) implies a certain order of one thing to another, one can find a principium in all those things which have an order.

1. order is found in quantified things

2. order is found in time

3. order is found in learning

4. order is found in the production of a thing

2. this word can be taken in three ways

1. so that principium is understood as the Person of the Son, who is the principle of creatures by reason of his active power acting with wisdom

2. principium can be understood as the Person of the Father, who is the principle not only of creatures, but of every divine process

3. principium can be taken for the beginning of duration

3. summary of the three explanations of how the word could be taken

1. the first explanation asserts the causality of the Word

2. the second affirms the consubstantiality of the Word with the Father, who utters the Word

3. the third affirms the co-eternity of the Word

3. thirdly, the meaning of the Word was in the beginning

1. now we should consider that it says that the Word was (erat), which is stated in the past imperfect tense

1. this tense is most appropriate for designating eternal things if we consider the nature of time and of the things that exist in time

2. but so far as concerns the notion of the present, the best way to designate eternity is the present tense, which indicates that something is in act, and this is always the characteristic of eternal things. And so it says in Exodus (3:14): “I am who am.” And Augustine40 says: “He alone truly is whose being does not know a past and a future.”

2. we should also note that this verb was, according to the Gloss, is not understood here as indicating temporal changes, as other verbs do, but as signifying the existence of a thing. Thus it is also called a substantive verb.

3. someone may ask how the Word can be co-eternal with the Father since he is begotten by the Father: for a human son, born from a human father, is subsequent to his father

1. I answer that there are three reasons why an originative principle is prior in duration to that which derives from that principle

1. first of all, if the originative principle of anything precedes in time the action by which it produces the thing of which it is the principle; thus a man does not begin to write as soon as he exists, and so he precedes his writing in time

2. secondly, if an action is successive; consequently, even if the action should happen to begin at the same time as the agent, the termination of the action is nevertheless subsequent to the agent. Thus, as soon as fire has been generated in a lower region, it begins to ascend; but the fire exists before it has ascended, because the motion by which it tends upward requires some time

3. thirdly, by the fact that sometimes the beginning of a thing depends on the will of its principle, just as the beginning of a creature’s coming-to-be depends on the will of God, such that God existed before any creature

2. yet none of these three is found in the generation of the divine

1. to the first reason: God did not first exist and then begin to generate the Word: for since the generation of the Word is nothing other than an intelligible conception, it would follow that God would be understanding in potency before understanding in act, which is impossible

2. to the second reason: again, it is impossible that the generation of the Word involve succession: for then the divine Word would be unformed before it was formed (as happens in us who form words by “cogitating”), which is false, as was said

3. to the third reason: again, we cannot say that the Father pre-established a beginning of duration for his Son by his own will because God the Father does not generate the Son by his will, as the Arians held, but naturally: for God the Father, understanding himself, conceives the Word; and so God the Father did not exist prior to the Son

3. An example of this, to a limited degree

1. appears in fire and in the brightness issuing from it: for this brightness issues naturally and without succession from the fire

2. again, if the fire were eternal, its brightness would be coeternal with it. This is why the Son is called the brightness of the Father: “the brightness of his glory” (Heb 1:3).

3. but this example lacks an illustration of the identity of nature. And so we call him Son, although in human sonship we do not find coeternity: for we must attain our knowledge of divine things from many likenesses in material things, for one likeness is not enough

4. The Council of Ephesus says that the Son always coexists with the Father

1. for “brightness” indicates his unchangeability,

2. “birth” points to the Word himself,

3. but the name “Son” suggests his consubstantiality

4. and so we give the Son various names to express his perfection, which cannot be expressed by one name

1. we call him “Son” to show that he is of the same nature as the Father

2. we call him “image” to show that he is not unlike the Father in any way;

3. we call him “brightness” to show that he is coeternal;

4. and he is called the “Word” to show that he is begotten in an immaterial manner

2. second clause: where he was, at and the Word was with God

1. first, we must consider the two new words: God and with

1. God

2. with

1. contrast with against in

2. with has four meanings, and these eliminate four objections

1. the preposition with signifies the subsistence of its antecedent

2. it signifies authority in its grammatical object

3. it asserts a distinction

4. it signifies a certain union and fellowship

3. the four objections

1. a two-fold objection against the explanation in which principium means the same as before all things

1. The first of these objections is this. You say that the Word was in the beginning, i.e., before all things. But before all things there was nothing. So if before all things there was nothing, where then was the Word?

2. The second objection against the same explanation is this. You say that the Word was in the beginning, i.e., before all things. But whatever exists before all things appears to proceed from no one, since that from which something proceeds seems to be prior to that which proceeds from it. Therefore, the Word does not proceed from another.

2. a two-fold objection against the explanation in which principium is understood as the Father

1. You say that In the beginning was the Word, i.e., the Son was in the Father. But that which is in something does not seem to be subsistent, as a hypostasis; just as the whiteness in a body does not subsist.

2. You say that the Word was in the beginning, i.e., in the Father. But whatever is in something is not distinct from it. So the Son is not distinct from the Father.

2. and, and the Word was with God, indicates:

1. according to Basil: the union of the Word with the Father in nature

2. according to Alcuin and Bede: their distinction in person

3. according to Chrysostom: the subsistence of the Word in the divine nature

4. according to Hilary: the authorship of the father in relation to the Word

5. according to Origen, we should also note: that the Word was with God shows that the Son has always been with the Father

1. for in the Old Testament it says that the word of the Lord “came” to Jeremiah or to someone else, as is plain in many passages of sacred Scripture

2. but it does not say that the word of the Lord was “with” Jeremiah or anyone else, because the word “comes” to those who begin to have the word after not having it

3. thus the Evangelist did not say that the Word “came” to the Father, but was “with” the Father, because, given the Father, the Word was with him

2. clauses 3 and 4: pertaining to the inquiry “what something is”

3. third clause: what he was, at and the Word was God

1. the fittingness, in this case, of discussing what a thing is after discussing where and when it is

2. this clause also enables us to answer two objections which arise from the foregoing

1. The first is based on the name “Word,” and is this. You say that In the beginning was the Word, and that the Word was with God. Now it is obvious that “word” is generally understood to signify a vocal sound and the statement of something necessary, a manifesting of thoughts. But these words pass away and do not subsist. Accordingly, someone could think that the Evangelist was speaking of a word like these.

2. The other question comes from his saying, with God. For since “with” indicates a distinction, it could be thought that the Word was with God, i.e., the Father, as distinct from him in nature.

3. note also the special way of signifying, since he says, the Word was God

4. we should also note that Origen disgracefully misunderstood this clause, led astray by the Greek manner of speaking

4. fourth clause: in what way he was, at He was in the beginning with God

1. two false interpretations could be held by those who misunderstand

1. one of these is by the pagans, who acknowledge many and different gods, and say that their wills are in opposition

2. the Arians were able to draw out another error from the above: they think that the Son is less than the Father

1. again, Arius admits that the Word was God, but nevertheless inferior to the Father. This is excluded by what follows

2. for there are two attributes proper to the great God which Arius attributed solely to God the Father, that is:

1. eternity

2. omnipotence

3. so in whomever these two attributes are found, he is the great God, than whom none is greater; but the Evangelist attributes these two to the Word

4. therefore, the Word is the great God, and not inferior

1. eternity: he says the Word is eternal when he states, He was in the beginning with God, i.e., the Word was with God from eternity, and not only in the beginning of creatures (as Arius held), but with God, receiving being and divinity from him

2. omnipotence: further, he attributes omnipotence to the Word when he adds, Through him all things came into being

2. Origen gives a rather beautiful explanation of this clause, He was in the beginning with God, when he says that it is not separate from the first three, but is in a certain sense their epilogue

3. further observations about the first four clauses

1. if one considers these four propositions well, he will find that they clearly destroy all the errors of the heretics and of the philosohpers

1. the errors of the heretics

1. Ebion and Cerinthus

2. Sabellius

3. Eunomius

2. the errors of the philosophers

1. some of the ancient philosophers, namely, the natural philosophers, maintained that the world did not come from any intellect or through some purpose, but by chance

2. Plato, however, thought that the ideas of all the things that were made were subsistent

3. other Platonists, as Chrysostom relates, maintained that God the Father was most eminent and first

4. Aristotle, however, thought that the ideas of all things are in God, and that in God, the intellect, the one understanding and what is understood, are the same

2. note the difference in what has been said between John and the other evangelists: how he began his gospel on a loftier plane than they

3. note also how the evangelist designedly uses the word was (erat) to show that the Word of God transcends all times: present, past, and future

2. second, of his power of operation

1. first, he shows his power with respect to all things that come into existence, and uses three clauses

1. first clause: all things were made through him

1. first, he used it to show three things concerning the Word

1. according to Chrysostom, to show the equality of the Word to the Father

2. according to Hilary, to show the coeternity of the Word with the Father

3. according to Augustine, to show the consubstantiality of the Word with the Father

2. second, here we must guard against three errors

1. first, the error of Valentinus: he understood All things were made through him to mean that the Word proffered to the Creator the cause of his creating the world; so that all things were made through the Word as if the Father’s creating the world came from the Word

2. second, the error of Origen: he said that the Holy Spirit was included among all the things made through the Word; from which it follows that he is a creature

3. third, we must avoid other of Origen’s errors: he said that all things were made through the Word as something is made by a greater through a lesser, as if the Son were inferior to, and an instrument of, the Father

3. third, if we carefully consider the words, All things were made through him, we can clearly see that the Evangelist spoke with the utmost exactitude

2. second clause: and without him nothing was made

1. first, this is the second clause which some have distorted, as Augustine says; they believed that he was using “nothing” in an affirmative sense; and three heresies came from this

1. first, that of Valentius; he affirmed, as Origen says, a multitude of principles, and taught that from them came thirty eras

2. second, that of Manichæus, who affirmed two opposing principles

1. first, one is the source of incorruptible things

2. second, the other the source of corruptible things

3. third, that of those who claim that by “nothing” we should understand the devil, according to Job 18:15, “may the companions of him who is not dwell in his house”

2. second, perhaps someone will object and say that it was superfluous to add this clause, if it is to be understood negatively

1. first, on the ground that the Evangelist, in stating that All things were made through him, seems to have already said adequately enough that there is not something that was not made through the Word

2. according to many expositors, the answer to this is that this clause was added in many ways for a number of reasons: one of these reasons is, according to Chrysostom, so that no one reading the Old Testament and finding only visible things listed by Moses in the creation of things, would think that these were the only things made through the Word

3. Chrysostom also gives another reason why this clause was added. For someone reading in the Gospels of the many signs and miracles worked by Christ, such as, “The blind see, the lame walk, lepers were cleansed” (Mt 11:5), might believe that in saying, All things were made through him, John meant that only the things mentioned in those Gospels, and nothing else, were made through him

4. according to Hilary, however, this clause is introduced to show that the Word has operative power from another. For since the Evangelist had said, All things were made through him, it might be supposed that the Father is excluded from all causality

5. according to Origen, we find another rather beautiful exposition; the Greek has choris where the Latin has sine (without). Now choris is the same as “outside” or “outside of.” It is as if he had said: All things were made through him in such a way that outside him nothing was made. And so he says this to show that all things are conserved through the Word and in the Word, as stated in Hebrews (1:3), “He sustains all things by his powerful word.”

6. according to Augustine, Origen, and several others: “nothing” indicates sin. Accordingly, because All things were made through him might be interpreted as including evil and sin, he added, and without him nothing, i.e., sin, was made

3. summary of the explanations for why this clause was added